Erbschaftsteuer, Vermmgensteuer oder Kapitaleinkommensteuer: Wie sollen hohe Vermmgen sttrker besteuert werden? (Inheritance Tax, Wealth Tax or Capital Income Tax)

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Bach
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
Inheritance Tax ◽  
Wealth Tax

Tax Amnesty 2004/2005 – An Appropriate Revenue Tool?

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 339-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Kellner
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
The Past ◽  
Inheritance Tax ◽  
Tax Amnesty ◽  
Tax Deductions ◽  
Wealth Tax ◽  
Gift Tax

Tax evasion is punishable. However, by tax amnesty the state waives punishment and gives tax dodgers the chance to return to honesty. The “Act To Promote Tax Honesty” offers people who evaded taxes between the years 1993 and 2002 an opportunity to wipe the slate clean by declaring their concealed income up to 2005. This offer applies to income tax, corporate tax, turnover tax, wealth tax, trade tax, inheritance tax, gift tax and tax deductions pursuant to the Einkommensteuergesetz (Income Tax Act). Amnesty participants must pay a reduced tax rate of 25 percent on declared income within ten days after the declaration. For income and corporate tax the assessment basis is reduced to 60 percent. Thereby the new law grants the repentant tax evaders a tax rate of 15 percent rather then usual up to 48 percent on the profits they gained in the past ten years.

Inheritance Taxation in a Model with Intergenerational Time Transfers

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Belan ◽  
Erwan Moussault
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Tax Reform ◽  
Labor Income ◽  
Generation Model ◽  
Time Transfer ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
Overlapping Generation ◽  
Inheritance Tax

Abstract We consider a two-period overlapping generation model with rational altruism à la Barro, where time transfers and bequests are available to parents. Starting from a steady state where public spending is financed through taxation on capital income and labor income, we analyze a tax reform that consists in a shift of the tax burden from capital income tax toward inheritance tax. In the standard Barro model with no time transfer and inelastic labor supply, such a policy decreases steady-state welfare. In our setting, inheritance tax modifies parents’ trade-off between time transfers and bequests. We identify situations where the tax reform increases welfare for all generations. Welfare improvement mainly depends on the magnitude of the effect of higher time transfers on the labor supply of the young.

scholarly journals Investor asset valuation under a wealth tax and a capital income tax

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petter Bjerksund ◽  
Guttorm Schjelderup
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Rate Of Return ◽  
International Capital ◽  
Asset Valuation ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Wealth Tax ◽  
Period Model

AbstractWe study how a capital income tax and a wealth tax affect an investor's valuation of a company's stock in an efficient international capital market. Using a one-period model, a model of infinite horizon where the asset generates a future cash flow that is a martingale, and a finite horizon model where we abandon the martingale assumption, we find that a wealth tax and/or a capital income tax do not lead investors to value an investment differently from untaxed investors. Investors who seek a higher pre-tax rate of return due to capital taxes harm their own wealth.

scholarly journals Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Conesa ◽  
Sagiri Kitao ◽  
Dirk Krueger
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Labor Income ◽  
Income Shocks ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Cycle Structure ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Average Household Income ◽  
Optimal Capital

We quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity differences of households. The optimal capital income tax rate is significantly positive at 36 percent. The optimal progressive labor income tax is, roughly, a flat tax of 23 percent with a deduction of $7,200 (relative to average household income of $42,000). The high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life-cycle structure of the model, whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system. (JEL E13, H21, H24, H25)

scholarly journals The Fiscal State-Dependent Effects of Capital Income Tax Cuts

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (71) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Fotiou ◽  
Wenyi Shen ◽  
Shu-Chun Susan Yang
Keyword(s):  
Regime Switching ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Government Debt ◽  
Smooth Transition ◽  
Consumption Tax ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
State Dependent ◽  
Fiscal State ◽  
High Level ◽  
Tax Cuts

Using the post-WWII data of U.S. federal corporate income tax changes, within a Smooth Transition VAR, this paper finds that the output effect of capital income tax cuts is government debt-dependent: it is less expansionary when debt is high than when it is low. To explore the mechanisms that can drive this fiscal state-dependent tax effect, the paper uses a DSGE model with regime-switching fiscal policy and finds that a capital income tax cut is stimulative to the extent that it is unlikely to result in a future fiscal adjustment. As government debt increases to a sufficiently high level, the probability of future fiscal adjustments starts rising, and the expansionary effects of a capital income tax cut can diminish substantially, whether the expected adjustments are through a policy reversal or a consumption tax increase. Also, a capital income tax cut need not always have large revenue feedback effects as suggested in the literature.

Natural Limits of Wealth Inequality and the Effectiveness of Tax Policy

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-57
Author(s):  
Scott S. Condie ◽  
Richard W. Evans ◽  
Kerk L. Phillips
Keyword(s):  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Wealth Accumulation ◽  
Rates Of Return ◽  
Unbalanced Growth ◽  
Wealth Concentration ◽  
Savings Rate ◽  
Wealth Tax ◽  
Growth Differences

This article examines Thomas Piketty’s thesis that there are no natural limits on the accumulation of wealth. We undertake our examination in the context of a simple general equilibrium model with infinitely lived dynasties. We show that extreme wealth accumulation does not happen in general equilibrium unless capital and labor are substitutes, an assumption which also leads to unbalanced growth. We also show that even with unbalanced growth, differences in rates of return and effective labor are not sufficient to cause unbounded inequality. Only permanent savings rate differences can lead to extreme wealth concentration. Finally, we show that while a flat wealth tax will not eliminate extreme wealth concentration, both a graduated wealth tax and a flat income tax will.

11. Taxation of trusts and settlements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn Wright ◽  
Clare Firth ◽  
Lucy Crompton ◽  
Helen Fox ◽  
Frances Seabridge ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Capital Gains Tax ◽  
Inheritance Tax

Settlements may be created by settlors in their lifetime, or by will, or they may arise under the intestacy rules. This chapter considers the tax implications of such settlements from the perspective of both the trustees and the beneficiaries. It considers each of the three main taxes separately: inheritance tax, capital gains tax, and income tax.

Tax Competition through Tax Evasion / Steuerwettbewerb über Steuerhinterziehung

2001 ◽  
Vol 221 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Beckmann
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Capital Income ◽  
The Core ◽  
Evasion Game ◽  
Tax Haven ◽  
Tax Harmonisation ◽  
Competitive Behaviour

SummaryIn the present paper, I analyse the competitive behaviour of benevolent governments in the presence of (capital) income tax evasion when information exchange is not possible. My approach is to introduce a cost of evasion function into an otherwise standard tax competition model and to explore three variants of the basic tax competition cum evasion game.Two distinct justifications for tax harmonisation emerge. First, harmonisation of taxation at the source can be supported with the usual spill-over argument that is at the core of the tax competition literature. This kind of argument does not apply to the harmonisation of residence-based taxes, however. Second, in a strategic situation where a tax haven facilitates tax evasion by citizens of the rest of the world, countries may find it to their advantage to coordinate their residence-based tax policies as well.

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