An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Performance of UK Firms

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Weir ◽  
David Laing ◽  
Phillip J. McKnight
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Do Multinational Companies Practice Good Corporate Governance? Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
G. M. Wali Ullah ◽  
Sarwar Uddin Ahmed ◽  
Samiul Parvez Ahmed ◽  
Kazi Md. Jamshed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Multinational Companies ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Way

Corporate Governance refers to the way an organization is directed, administrated or controlled. It includes the set of rules and regulations that affect the manager's decision and contribute to the way company is perceived by the current and potential stakeholders. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as; boards, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures and also decision-making assistance on corporate affairs. Corporate governance practices in Bangladesh are gradually being introduced in most companies and organizations (Du, 2006). However, Bangladesh has fallen behind its neighboring countries and global economy in corporate governance (Gillibrand, 2004). Corporate governance structure is mainly considered ambiguous. Specific governance structures or practices will not necessarily fit all companies at all times. Firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms are generally associated with better financial performance, higher firm valuation and higher stock returns. Unfortunately, investors in Bangladesh have a little information about how these corporate values affect the performance of the Multinational Companies (MNCs). This study aims to provide a quantitative contribution to the literature by examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance from the perspective of MNCs. A panel data based Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression model was used to measure the quantitative significance of various corporate governance related variables on MNC performance, as identified through a detailed literature review.

scholarly journals Capital Structure and Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE)

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Mejbel Al-Saidi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Kuwait Stock Exchange ◽  
Corporate Capital Structure ◽  
The Impact

The study investigated the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the corporate capital structure of the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE). Specifically, this study linked five corporate governance mechanisms—large shareholder ownership concentration, government ownership concentration, board size, board independence, and family directors—with capital structure for 81 non-financial listed firms between 2017 and 2018. The data indicated that only government ownership concentration and family directors affect capital structure.

Corporate governance and risk in cross-listed and Canadian only companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (10) ◽  
pp. 2740-2757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atreya Chakraborty ◽  
Lucia Gao ◽  
Shahbaz Sheikh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Differential Effect ◽  
Composite Index ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a differential effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk in Canadian companies cross-listed on US markets and Canadian companies not cross-listed (Canadian only companies). Design/methodology/approach Using a sample comprised of all Canadian companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index for the period 2009–2014, this study applies OLS and fixed effect regressions to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Interaction variables between governance mechanisms and the cross-listing status are used to examine if this effect is different for cross-listed firms. Findings Results indicate that the effect of board characteristics such as size, independence and proportion of female directors remains the same in both cross-listed and not cross-listed firms. CEO duality and insider equity ownership impact firm risk only in cross-listed companies, while institutional shareholdings, environmental, social and governance disclosure and family control affect firm risk in Canadian only firms. Overall, the empirical results indicate that some governance mechanisms impact firm risk only in firms that cross-list, while others are well-suited for Canadian only firms. Practical implications This study suggests that some of the differences between Canadian companies that cross-list and the Canadian companies that do not cross-list in US stock markets may change the impact of governance mechanisms on firm risk. Therefore, these findings have important implications for the design of governance mechanisms in Canadian firms. Since some of these differences are common to other economies, the conclusions can be extended to companies in other countries with similar governance structures. Originality/value Although previous studies have investigated the effect of governance mechanism on firm risk, this is the first paper that studies the differential effect for companies that cross-list in US markets. Specifically, differences in the ownership structure, firm control and in the regulatory and institutional environment, may explain this differential effect. Unlike most of the previous studies that focus on the effect of individual governance mechanisms, this study uses several mechanisms and their interactions at the same time.

The Impact Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms On Earnings Quality: Evidence From Egypt

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-108
Author(s):  
صلاح عبدالحفیظ مصطفى على ◽  
عبدالمحسن محمد الدسوقی
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Quality Evidence

Corporate governance and underpricing of small and medium enterprises IPOs in India

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-525
Author(s):  
Nischay Arora ◽  
Balwinder Singh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Curvilinear Relationship ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, i.e. board structure and ownership structure on the underpricing of small and medium enterprises (SME) IPOs in India. Design/methodology/approach Most of the extant empirical research studies have either pivoted on mainstream IPOs or SMEs IPOs in developed economies, but the present study examines 200 SME IPOs issued during Feb 2012 to April 2017. Multiple regressions have been used to examine the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms on raw return (RR). Furthermore, robustness of the results has been verified through the employment of market-adjusted excess return (MAER) as an additional proxy of underpricing. Findings The results highlight that board size, inverse of board committees, board independence, board age, board directorships positively, and top ten shareholding negatively influence RR. Further, direction of promoter ownership variable indicates curvilinear relationship with underpricing. Other explanatory variables used in model lack statistical validity. Similar results have been obtained when variables were regressed against MAER with related board members being additionally significant in model. Practical implications The findings suggest that Indian investors do take cues from board structure and ownership patterns for making investment decisions in small- and medium-sized firms. Further, the results are also helpful to top management in structuring their boards. Originality/value The present research enriches SME IPOs underpricing literature because the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on unadjusted returns is relatively under explored particularly within the context of small- and medium-sized firms.

The impact of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Schäuble
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Frontier Analysis ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs. Design/methodology/approach The author uses data from German firms that were listed in the regulated market of the Frankfurt Stock exchange during 2006-2011. Agency costs were measured using stochastic frontier analysis, a relatively new approach to estimate agency costs. The regression analysis is applied to test the model. Findings The results indicate that an industry specialized audit firm, the presence of a large audit firm, abnormal audit fees, management ownership and variable management compensation are significantly negatively associated with the level of a firms’ agency costs. In contrast, this seems not to be true for the existence of an audit committee for which the results of the paper document a non-significant association. Originality/value The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the research design is to the best of the authors’ knowledge the first that investigates the influence of different corporate governance mechanisms on the level of agency costs. Second, previous studies are mainly focused on the US audit market. This focus on the US audit market leaves uncertainties regarding the direction and magnitude of the empirical relationship in the European and German environmental context. Finally, the paper provides initial empirical evidence for a sample of German IFRS listed companies (IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards).

The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Relationship Between Cash Holdings and Audit Fees in Egyptian Listed Companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 314
Author(s):  
Eman Abdel-Wanis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explores the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the nature of the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees, which helps provide an opportunity to identify whether these mechanisms enable to mitigate agency problems, and thus lower audit fees through a sample of 78 Egyptian listed firms in EGX 100 during the period 2014-2016 using panel data analysis. Results indicated that cash holding increases auditing fees. The board characteristics affect negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. Also, ownership structure affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. As well audit committee affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. There results support the view that corporate governance mitigate on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees.

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