Child Labor Laws and Household Fertility Decisions: Evidence from Nigeria

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Penglase
2005 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 1492-1524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Doepke ◽  
Fabrizio Zilibotti

We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change, which induces parents to choose smaller families. The theory can account for the observation that, in Britain, regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapid fertility decline.


1908 ◽  
Vol 68 (12) ◽  
pp. 330-332
Author(s):  
Albert J. Beveridge

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Anderson

Industrial child labor laws were the earliest manifestation of the modern regulatory welfare state. Why, despite the absence of political pressure from below, did some states (but not others) succeed in legislating working hours, minimum ages, and schooling requirements for working children in the first half of the nineteenth century? I use case studies of the politics behind the first child labor laws in Germany and France, alongside a case study of a failed child labor reform effort in Belgium, to answer this question. I show that existing structural, class-based, and institutional theories of the welfare state are insufficient to explain why child labor laws came about. Highlighting instead the previously neglected role of elite policy entrepreneurs, I argue that the success or failure of early nineteenth-century child labor laws depended on these actors’ social skill, pragmatic creativity, and goal-directedness. At the same time, their actions and influence were conditioned by their field position and the architecture of the policy field. By specifying the qualities and conditions that enable policy entrepreneurs to build the alliances needed to effect policy change, this analysis lends precision to the general claim that their agency matters.


2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Marlenga ◽  
Richard L. Berg ◽  
James G. Linneman ◽  
Robert J. Brison ◽  
William Pickett

Author(s):  
Maryann Syers

Katharine Fredrica Lenroot (1891–1982), praised for her contributions to child welfare, juvenile delinquency, and child labor laws, worked at the U.S. Children's Bureau for 37 years. She became its chief in 1934 and represented the United States at UNICEF.


1980 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. B. Mitchell ◽  
John Clapp

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