Aplicaciin de Tarifas de Terminaciin Asimmtricas en el servicio de Telecomunicaciin MMvil en MMxico (Application of Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rates in Mexico)

Mobile termination rates and retail regimes in Europe and the US: a unified theory of CPP and RPP

Information Economics and Policy ◽

10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100915 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 100915

Author(s):

Sjaak Hurkens ◽

Ángel L. López

Keyword(s):

Unified Theory ◽

The Us ◽

Mobile Termination

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Mobilterminierung im Wettbewerb

Review of Economics ◽

10.1515/roe-2009-0101 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 60 (1) ◽

pp. 1-16 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jörn Kruse

Keyword(s):

Price Regulation ◽

Competitive Market ◽

Regulatory Agencies ◽

Competitive Pressure ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Termination Problem ◽

Mobile Termination

SummaryThe regulatory agencies found mobile termination to be monopolistic and adopted a policy of ex ante price regulation in recent years. This paper discusses two structural alternatives putting mobile termination under competitive pressure. The first one is the “receiving-party-pays-principle” where mobile termination is a part of the service bundle puchased by the mobile customer. The second is the proposal of a “mobile termination competition”. It turns mobile termination into a specific competitive market and looks like the optimal economic answer to the mobile termination problem. It works on the consumer as well as on the wholesale level.

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Aktuelle Entwicklungen der europäischen TK-Regulierung

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik ◽

10.1515/zfwp-2014-0103 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 63 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Andreas Westermeier

Keyword(s):

Economic Theory ◽

European Commission ◽

Market Competition ◽

European Market ◽

Current Regulation ◽

Regulatory Authorities ◽

Aktuelle Entwicklungen ◽

Market Consolidation ◽

Mobile Termination

AbstractThis article deals with current developments concerning the regulation of telecommunication in Europe (e. g. Mobile Termination Rates, Roaming). It argues that current regulation is led by political aims and less by economic theory. National regulatory authorities should have more competences to consider national specifities concerning their decisions. The competences of the European Commission should be cut back. The idea of four or five pan-European companies dominating the European market should be discarded. Market consolidation should be the result of market competition and not promoted by the European Commission.

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