Unfolding the Layers of Leniency Programme - A Must for Cartel Detection in India

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ritam Arora
Keyword(s):  
Leniency Programme ◽  
Cartel Detection

scholarly journals The Polish Leniency Programme and the Implementation of the ECN+ Directive Leniency-related Standards in Poland

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 9-54
Author(s):  
Patrycja Szot
Keyword(s):  
General Level ◽  
Universal Language ◽  
Current State ◽  
One Stop ◽  
Leniency Programme ◽  
The Eu

This publication discusses the current state of the Polish leniency programme and the amendments required in order to implement the ECN+ Directive (in particular in the area of specific conditions for leniency, individual sanctions, protection of leniency statements or leniency plus) as well as harmonisation flaws (primarily lack of one-stop-shop, universal language, failure to lay down rules regulating the reduction of fines or fully coordinating rules on immunity from individual sanctions, lack of harmonisation regarding applications in non-cartel cases). The a uthor’s view is that the Polish system in broad terms corresponds to the majority of the harmonised standards owing to soft harmonisation based on the Model Leniency Programme and the EU leniency programme. Further, the implementation will not bring about revolutionary changes, unless combined with de lege ferenda improvements and enhancements in the general level of anti-cartel enforcement.

7. Articles 101 and 102: public enforcement by the European Commission and national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003

2021 ◽  
pp. 258-310
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Public ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Leniency Programme

This chapter explains the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 by European Commission and the national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003. It begins by describing the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, including its power to accept commitments, its leniency programme, the cartel settlement procedure, and its power to impose financial penalties. It then discusses the operation of Regulation 1/2003 in practice, with particular reference to the European Competition Network (‘the ECN’) that brings together the Commission and the national competition authorities of the Member States (‘the NCAs’) and the ECN+ Directive that strengthens the powers of the NCAs. The chapter concludes by providing a brief account of judicial review of the Commission’s decisions.

4 Cartel Detection

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Argenton Cédric ◽  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Stephan Andreas
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
Vast Number ◽  
Market Monitoring ◽  
Leniency Programs ◽  
The Us ◽  
Private Homes ◽  
Full Immunity ◽  
Cartel Detection

This chapter is concerned with cartel detection, through market monitoring, inspections, or well-designed leniency programs. It analyses three methods competition authorities regularly use to detect, and adduce evidence about, cartels. First, competition authorities can detect cartels by monitoring and screening markets. Second, competition authorities can conduct inspections at the business premises or private homes of cartel participants. Third, given the limitations of the first two methods, competition authorities can incentivize companies to report the cartels in which they may be involved by rewarding them for their cooperation. Pursuant to so-called leniency programmes, companies that choose to cooperate will, depending on the quality of the information provided and the time at which it is provided, benefit from full immunity from fines or significant fine reductions (partial immunity). Following in the footsteps of the US Department of Justice, the European Commission adopted a Leniency Notice in 1996, the application of which has allowed it to uncover a vast number of cartels.

Probability of Cartel Detection in Spain: An Assessment

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 188-193
Author(s):  
Javier García-Verdugo ◽  
Carlos Merino Troncoso ◽  
Ane M Martin
Keyword(s):  
Cartel Detection

scholarly journals Cartel Detection in Procurement Markets

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Hüschelrath ◽  
Tobias Veith
Keyword(s):  
Cartel Detection

Enhancing leniency programme in public markets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Penelope Alexia Giosa
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Public Markets ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Court ◽  
Private Action ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Self Cleaning ◽  
Leniency Programme

Abstract The article focuses on the leniency programme, the key mechanism to strengthen the public enforcement of competition law, and its compatibility with the debarment mechanism and self-cleaning measures, which are both procurement remedies. As the article will show, procurement remedies interfere with cartel enforcement and the debarment mechanism undermines leniency in public procurement. The fact that firms may be banned from bidding, where there are plausible indications for their participation in agreements aiming at distorting competition, discourages infringing companies from coming forward and self-reporting. Even the self-cleaning measures under the current procurement Directive 2014/24/EU, which aim to help debarred firms to avoid exclusion or minimize its risk, undermine leniency in public procurement. This is particularly true after the recent judgment of the European Court of Justice in c-124/17 Vossloh Laeis GmbH v Stadtwerke München GmbH case. In this case, it was held that a contracting authority must be able to ask a leniency applicant to provide the decision of the competition authority concerning it. This must apply even if there is a pending private action for damages for breach of competition law by the contracting authority against that leniency applicant. In view of the above conflicting policy objectives, a number of proposals are discussed in order to better align leniency programmes with the mechanism of debarment and self-cleaning policy in public procurement. In this way, the article contributes to the optimal design of enforcement policies.

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