Dynamic Platform Competition: Optimal Pricing and Piggybacking Under Network Effects

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yifan Dou ◽  
D. J. Wu
2020 ◽  
pp. 014920632096979
Author(s):  
Joost Rietveld ◽  
Melissa A. Schilling

Over the past three decades, platform competition—the competition between firms that facilitate transactions and govern interactions between two or more distinct user groups who are connected via an indirect network—has attracted significant interest from the fields of management and organizations, information systems, economics, and marketing. Despite common interests in research questions, methodologies, and empirical contexts by scholars from across these fields, the literature has developed mostly in isolated fashion. This article offers a systematic and interdisciplinary review of the literature on platform competition by analyzing a sample of 333 articles published between 1985 and 2019. The review contributes by (a) documenting how the literature on platform competition has evolved; (b) outlining four themes of shared scholarly interest, including how network effects generate “winner-takes-all” dynamics that influence strategies, such as pricing and quality; how network externalities and platform strategy interact with corporate-level decisions, such as vertical integration or diversification into complementary goods; how heterogeneity in the platform and its users influences platform dynamics; and how the platform “hub” orchestrates value creation and capture in the overall ecosystem; and (c) highlighting several areas for future research. The review aims to facilitate a broader understanding of the platform competition research that helps to advance our knowledge of how platforms compete to create and capture value.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chenhao Du ◽  
William L. Cooper ◽  
Zizhuo Wang

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Yunmiao Gui ◽  
Bengang Gong

This paper examines the platform competition strategy in offering quality assurance policy based on two-sided B2C markets with buyers and sellers who trade through the B2C platform. We model this as a strategy decision whether control rights of quality assurance level are better held by the seller or by the platform. Whether the seller or the platform that provides quality assurance policy is preferred depends on their influence on network effects. We show that the seller and the platform have no strong intention to improve the quality assurance level in the monopoly markets. When all buyers multihome and all sellers single-home, sellers who hold the control rights of quality assurance are better than platforms. However, platforms that hold quality assurance drive more profits than sellers in the B2C markets where all buyers and all sellers multihome. Our findings connect platform competitive strategies to market and microfoundation of quality, which applies directly to managerial decisions in the B2C two-sided platform.


Omega ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 69-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guoquan Zhang ◽  
Jennifer Shang ◽  
Pinar Yildirim

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