Moral Psychology, Stability and the Law of Peoples

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Reidy
2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-397
Author(s):  
David A. Reidy

In this paper I take seriously Rawls’s characterization of his The Law of Peoples as carrying forward the project of Political Liberalism. The latter articulates Rawls’s reworking of the stability argument from Part III of A Theory of Justice to better square it with the permanent fact of reasonable doctrinal pluralism under conditions of freedom and right. As presented in Theory the stability argument is an argument from moral psychology. This moral psychology structures the problem generated by doctrinal pluralism in both Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples, each of which sets out a consistent principled liberal response to it, the former in the domestic, and the latter in the international, context. Bringing this moral psychology to the surface sheds considerable light on Rawls’s attempt to vindicate the possibility of world hospitable to enduring just and stable constitutional liberal democracies governed by legitimate law.


Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira ◽  

The aim of this paper is to identify how the ethical-political foundation of human rights in John Rawls’s theory of justice makes use of a coherentist model of moral justification in which cognitivism, liberalism, pluralism, non-foundationalism, and mitigated intuititionism stand out, leading to a pragmatic model of foundation with public justification in The Law of Peoples (LP). The main idea is to think about the reasonableness of the universal defence of human rights as primary goods with the aspects foliows: its political nature, not metaphysical; its theoretical coherentist model, non-foundationalist; its pragmatic function and its public justification.


2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Milica Trifunovic

The article gives conceptual clarification on a distinction between ideal and nonideal theory by analyzing John Rawls? theory as presented in his books ?A Theory of Justice? and ?The Law of Peoples.? The article tries to show the importance of ideal theory, while at the same time pointing out that the distinction, ideal and nonideal, needs further qualification. Further, the article also introduces the distinction of normative and descriptive into ideal and consequently nonideal theory. Through this four-fold distinction it is easier to establish the function of each theory and the separation of work-fields between philosophers, politicians and lawyers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (13) ◽  
pp. 171-180
Author(s):  
Anna Paula Bagetti Zeifert
Keyword(s):  

No presente artigo analisamos como o projeto de justiça social rawlsiano, pensado inicialmente para as sociedades nacionais, foi estendido para a Sociedade dos Povos na obra The Law of Peoples. Examinamos como John Rawls resgata e apresenta seus elementos essenciais na proposta de justiça entre os povos, sua preocupação em garantir estabilidade e o mínimo de justiça social no interior das sociedades que integram a Sociedade dos Povos. Ponderamos como seus objetivos se encontram interligados tanto na proposta de justiça política para o interior dos Estados, quanto na relação entre Estados, garantindo a legitimidade das sociedades a partir de uma estrutura básica e de instituições justas. Nesse contexto, nosso objetivo é demonstrar que ao pensar esse processo paralelo de justiça (nacional e internacional), e projetar uma segunda posição original, guia para seus elementos essenciais com vistas a promoção da justiça social entre os povos, Rawls também apresentou os limites da sua realistic utopia e os caminhos para a reconciliação do indivíduo com o mundo social ao qual pertence. O estudo foi desenvolvido com base no método de abordagem hipotético-dedutivo, utilizando uma base teórica presente na filosofia política contemporânea.


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