An International Examination of the Role of Default and Liquidity Risks in the Interbank Market.

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Karouzakis
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-45
Author(s):  
Rituparna Das

During the period 2011-12 of economic downturn characterized typically by economy wide loan defaults many banks in India are reported to have posted adequate levels of capital but experienced difficulties due to unsound liquidity management. In an attempt to examine the ease of liquidity management procedure of the Indian banking industry, this paper critically examines whether the central bank of the country facilitates liquidity management of the banks during the stress periods. The finding is that it does not.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Liberati ◽  
Massimiliano Marzo ◽  
Paolo Zagaglia ◽  
Paola Zappa

2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young Sik Kim

This paper provides an explanation for the supervisory role of the central bank in a monetary general equilibrium model of bank liquidity provision. Under incomplete information on the individual banks' liquidity needs, individual banks find it optimal to invest solely in bank loans holding no cash reserves, and rely on the interbank market for their withdrawal demands. Using the costly state verification approach under uncertainty in aggregate liquidity demands, the supervisory role of the central bank as a large intermediary arises as an incentive-compatible arrangement by which banks hold the correct level of cash reserves. First, it takes up a delegated monitoring role for the banking system. Second, it engages in discount-window lending at a penalty rate, where the discount margin covers exactly the monitoring cost incurred. Finally, under the central banking mechanism, currency premium no longer exists in the sense that currency is worth the same as deposits having an equal face value.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document