Constitutional Judicial Review, Chief Justices, and Judges' Preferences: Institutional Lessons and Israel's High Court of Justice

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maoz Rosenthal
1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meir Shamgar

Some fifteen years ago, an address on the subject of judicial review of the actions of the Knesset would have been extremely short and quite familiar to English jurists. Our practice was basically the same as in England: the Parliament is sovereign, its laws inviolate, and its inner proceedings immune from review.Beginning with two decisions in the early 1980s, Flato-Sharon and Sarid, the Court has gradually recognized the justiciability of a limited range of Knesset decisions. While the precise level of review varies according to the type of decision at issue, the Court's review has been motivated in all cases by the need to preserve the rule of law and the integrity of our democratic regime.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gonen Ilan

Abstract In an article published recently in the Statue Law Review,1 Prof. Shucheng Wang has examined the deferential approach to judicial review of the legislative process as adopted by the CFA,2 due to the Leung3 case. In this short response, I focus on two issues that are not mentioned in Prof. Wang’s article but that are crucial for understanding recent developments concerning judicial review of the legislative process in Israel by Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ). First, this response will present the most recent, and more crucial, ruling of the HCJ from late 2017 in the Quantinsky v. The Israeli Knesset (2017)4 which established a new precedent and in which, for the first time in Israel’s history, a new law was invalidated due to flaws in the legislative process. Second, I wish to emphasize the specific type of law that was invalidated and that is more prone to flaws in the legislative process: The Omnibus Law of Arrangement in the State Economy, which includes hundreds of budget statutes, and is characterized by a very unique and hasty legislative process. Therefore, this response wishes to complement Prof. Wang’s thesis and provide an update regarding the Israeli HCJ judicial approach of due process of legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabrielle Appleby

Drawing on the scholarly commentariat tradition now practised across the world, this article provides an overview and analysis of the 2018 Australian High Court’s constitutional term. However, this article approaches this task through a slightly different lens: I consider the 2018 developments by reference to their inter-institutional context. That is, how the High Court’s jurisdictional and doctrinal developments do and should impact the jurisdiction and behaviour of the other branches of government, and in the context of constitutional judicial review, particularly the Australian parliaments. In the article, I consider the High Court’s 2018 constitutional jurisprudence in three areas of law, and how its decisions have and should impact the constitutional responsibilities and practice of parliaments. Placing the High Court’s term in this inter-institutional context will give a better sense of the reach of the impact of the Court’s jurisprudential developments, as well as serve as a reminder that constitutional responsibility will not always lie with the courts for the articulation and prioritisation of constitutional principle.


Author(s):  
Tatiana N. Mikheeva ◽  
◽  
Anastasiya Yu. Stepanova ◽  

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-901
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Geoffrey R. Watson

Mara'Abe v. Prime Minister of Israel. Case No. HCJ 7957/04. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html> (English translation).Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, September 15, 2005.In Mara ‘abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the routing of a portion of Israel's “security fence” in the northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ordered the Israeli government to consider alternative paths for the barrier. The Mara'abe decision expanded on the Court's earlier ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, in which the Court ordered the rerouting of another segment of the obstacle. Mara ’abe also revealed some of the Israeli Court's views on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory— the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that construction of the barrier anywhere in occupied territory violates international law.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Orna Ben-Naftali ◽  
Keren Michaeli

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006.In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel1 Targeted Killings) the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined the legality of Israel's “preventative targeted killings” of members of militant Palestinian organizations. The Court's unanimous conclusion reads:The result of the examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (§51(3) of [Additional Protocol I]). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. (Para. 60)


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