Sports Betting As a New Asset Class: Can a Sports Trader Beat Hedge Fund Managers from 2010-2016?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lovjit Thukral ◽  
Pedro Vergel
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Sports Betting ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Class

scholarly journals Traditional and Alternative Risk: Application to Hedge Fund Returns

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-33
Author(s):  
Claudio Boido ◽  
Antonio Fasano
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Relative Advantage ◽  
Investment Policies ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Class ◽  
Illiquid Investments ◽  
Hedge Fund Returns ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance ◽  
The Impact

This study compares the risk-adjusted performance of traditional and alternative investments. Instrumental to this design, we introduce a specific metric for assessing hedge fund performance, comprising both the relative advantage and the extra-risk of an alternative investment over a traditional one. We are concerned with the impact of the crisis. Common wisdom tells us that during phases of market euphoria, investors’ wishful thinking can make them overconfident of the high returns promised by the leveraged structures and the aggressive investment policies typical of this asset class; conversely, when the downturns hit, the “big bets”, taken by hedge fund managers, in risky and illiquid investments, can trigger severe losses in their investors’ portfolios. We found evidence that regime switches in stock returns emphasise the performance gap among the different fund investment policies; furthermore, some styles can effectively capitalise on managerial skill, outperforming traditional equity investment in terms of adjusted performance.

Do Hedge Fund Managers Display Skill?

CFA Digest ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-13
Author(s):  
Keith H. Black
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Managers

Why Do Hedge Fund Managers Outperform?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Istvan Nagy ◽  
Ivan Guidotti
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Managers

Duration of poor performance and risk shifting by hedge fund managers

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 35-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Li ◽  
A. Steven Holland ◽  
Hossein B. Kazemi
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Risk Shifting ◽  
Fund Managers

scholarly journals HEDGE FUNDS: RISK AND PERFORMANCE

2018 ◽  
Vol 06 (01) ◽  
pp. 1850003
Author(s):  
SANGHEON SHIN ◽  
JAN SMOLARSKI ◽  
GÖKÇE SOYDEMIR
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Factor Model ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Asset Class ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Fund Portfolio

This paper models hedge fund exposure to risk factors and examines time-varying performance of hedge funds. From existing models such as asset-based style (ABS)-factor model, standard asset class (SAC)-factor model, and four-factor model, we extract the best six factors for each hedge fund portfolio by investment strategy. Then, we find combinations of risk factors that explain most of the variance in performance of each hedge fund portfolio based on investment strategy. The results show instability of coefficients in the performance attribution regression. Incorporating a time-varying factor exposure feature would be the best way to measure hedge fund performance. Furthermore, the optimal models with fewer factors exhibit greater explanatory power than existing models. Using rolling regressions, our customized investment strategy model shows how hedge funds are sensitive to risk factors according to market conditions.

Timing is Money: The Factor Timing Ability of Hedge Fund Managers

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Osinga ◽  
Marc Schauten ◽  
Remco C. J. Zwinkels
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Timing Ability

Determinants of Hedge Fund Internal Controls and Fees

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Value ◽  
Net Asset Value ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Financial Misstatement

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document