Rent Seeking and Institutional Evolution within the California Water Game

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Caton
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Institutional Evolution ◽  
California Water

Forming a new reality: From quasi-market to contractual razdatok

2017 ◽  
pp. 96-113
Author(s):  
O. Bessonova
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Universal Model ◽  
Institutional Evolution ◽  
Dynamic Growth

The article analyzes the key properties of the basic institutional models of the 21st century - the quasi-market and contractual razdatok . It shows that as a result of institutional evolution, during which the razdatok and the market are improving their forms, a new reality is being formed, which is no longer in contrasting market and razdatok institutions, but in their synthesis. Integration of the market and razdatok occurs in two types of synthesis, and leads to the formation of either a quasi-market model or a contractual razdatok . The quasi-market is the reason for the rent-seeking motivation and stagnation of the economy, while the contractual razdatok is a new universal model, leading to dynamic growth.

Peran Pengawasan Internal Dalam Menghindari Kutukan Sumber Daya Alam

Liquidity ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Andilo Tohom
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Rich Country ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
The World ◽  
Policies And Programs ◽  
The Right

Indonesia is one of many countries in the world so called resource-rich country. Natural resources abundance needs to be managed in the right way in order to avoid dutch diseases and resources curses. These two phenomena generally happened in the country, which has abundant natural resources. Learned from Norwegian experiences, Indonesian Government need to focus its policy to prevent rent seeking activities. The literature study presented in this paper is aimed to provide important insight for government entities in focusing their policies and programs to avoid resources curse. From the internal audit perspective, this study is expected to improve internal audit’s role in assurance and consulting.

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

On the Origins of Administrative Rent: Doing Business in a Russian Region N

2010 ◽  
pp. 58-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Oleinik
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Resource Rent ◽  
Competitive Edge ◽  
Doing Business ◽  
Russian Region ◽  
Positive Gain ◽  
Access To The Field ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Methods

In the article two types of rent are differentiated: resource rent and administrative rent. The latter is linked to restrictions on the access to the field of interactions. The contribution of the theory of public choice and the theory of rent-seeking and directly-unproductive activities is further developed by shifting the emphasis from individual decision-making to interactions between three actors: C, who controls access to the field, A, who gets a competitive edge as a result, and B, who assumes a subjacent position with regard to both A and C, yet still receives a positive gain from transacting. Domination by virtue of a constellation of As, Bs, and Cs interests is illustrated with the help of an in-depth case study of a Russian region. This study combines quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as their triangulation.

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