Federal Preemption and Interest Rate Exportation: Madden's Impact on National Banks, the Secondary Credit Market, and P2P Lending Counsels for Its Reversal

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Marvin
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
Federal Preemption

What Influences the Market Outcome of Online P2P Lending Marketplace?

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 23-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yun Xu ◽  
Chuan Luo ◽  
Dongyu Chen ◽  
Haichao Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Online Communities ◽  
Global Perspective ◽  
Archival Data ◽  
Bank Institution ◽  
Creditor Bank ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
The U.S

Online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending marketplaces allow individuals to lend and borrow directly among each other without the mediation of a creditor bank institution. Prior literature has examined online P2P, but has largely been limited to the Western context. This paper thus explores how social capital and other factors influences online P2P lending in the U.S. and China. Based on the archival data of Prosper and PPDai, we compare market outcome of two online P2P lending marketplaces in the U.S. and China. The empirical results show that social capital is not equally important in different online communities. Social capital seems to be more influential for likelihood of getting funded in China than in the U.S. In contrast, social capital has influence on interest rate in the U.S. only. The authors' study thus extends current understanding about how social capital influences online communities to a global perspective.

scholarly journals Optimizing the Borrowing Limit and Interest Rate in P2P System: From Borrowers’ Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Zhihong Li ◽  
Lanteng Wu ◽  
Hongting Tang
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Bp Neural Network ◽  
Interval Estimation ◽  
Real World Data ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
P2p System ◽  
Benefits And Costs

P2P (peer-to-peer) lending is an emerging online service that allows individuals to borrow money from unrelated person without the intervention of traditional financial intermediaries. In these platforms, borrowing limit and interest rate are two of the most notable elements for borrowers, which directly influence their borrowing benefits and costs, respectively. To that end, this paper introduces a BP neural network interval estimation (BPIE) algorithm to predict the borrowers’ borrowing limit and interest rate based on their characteristics and simultaneously develops a new parameter optimization algorithm (GBPO) based on the genetic algorithm and our BP neural network predictive model to optimize them. Using real-world data from http://ppdai.com, the experimental results show that our proposed model achieves a good performance. This research provides a new perspective from borrowers in exploring the P2P lending. The case base and proposed knowledge are the two contributions for FinTech research.

Zinsdifferenzen, Verhandlungsfähigkeit und Bankenwettbewerb auf einem unvollkommenen Kreditmarkt / Interest Rate Differences, Bargaining Ability, and Imperfect Competition in the Credit Market

1995 ◽  
Vol 214 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Horst Gischer
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Credit Market

ZusammenfassungVor dem Hintergrund empirisch beobachtbarer Zinsdifferenzen wird das Verhalten von Banken und Schuldnern in einem einfachen Modell der Kreditvergabe beschrieben. Die Gläubiger unterstellen den Darlehensnehmern individuelle maximale Schuldendienstpotentiale, die als Budgetrestriktion fungieren. Gleichzeitig berücksichtigen die Banken potentielle Konkurrenzangebote, ohne nähere Informationen über deren Zahl und Konditionen zu besitzen. Kreditnachfragern entstehen Suchkosten, so daß letztlich (gleichgewichtige) Zinsdispersionen abgeleitet werden können, die den Gläubigern Anbieterrenten einräumen, aber vom unvollkommenen Wettbewerb nicht erodiert werden. Die Verhandlungsfähigkeit von Schuldnern einwandfreier Bonität ermöglicht diesen günstige Konditionen, während Kreditnehmer mit hohen Suchkosten und weniger guter Bonität höhere Zinsen zahlen, was jedoch keine Risikokompensation widerspiegelt.

scholarly journals The Analysis Of The Rural Credit Market In Ghana

2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
George Owusu-Antwi ◽  
James Antwi
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Rural Economy ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Credit System ◽  
Theoretical Understanding ◽  
Interest Rate Policy ◽  
Rural Credit ◽  
Rural Credit Market

The formal banking sector does not satisfy the growing demand for credit, and many borrowers turn to informal loan sources to meet their production and consumption needs. The problem of the rural credit, which includes supplying credit for a rural community for economic growth, is reemerging on the development agenda as a pressing issue. The rural economy is financially very fragile. Lack of credit is a significant and sometimes binding constraint, limiting investment in productivity-enhancing technology and inputs. Rural credit plays a critical role in household strategies to reduce vulnerability. In spite of the contribution that credit entails to the rural development, it has been one of the crucial factors that have not been given proper attention. The purpose of this paper is to identify problems that have hindered the effectiveness of the rural credit market in Ghana. The paper is premised on the theoretical understanding of rural credit markets and applies the framework to investigate the aspect of the rural credit market in Ghana. Improving the rural credit system will help to raise household incomes and reduce poverty and will contribute to the eradication of extreme poverty. The paper identifies high cost, interest rate, lack of collateral, lack of innovation and high delinquency rates as the main factors that have hindered the effectiveness of the rural credit market in Ghana. This paper will interest policymakers to place more emphasis on savings mobilization and to revisit interest rate policy, while providing cheap and adequate credit to small and poor farmers.

An Evolutionary Behavior Forecasting Model for Online Lenders and Borrowers in Peer-to-Peer Lending

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (01) ◽  
pp. 1740008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Li-Qiu Xia
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Mutual Effect ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Forecasting Model ◽  
Private Lending ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
Numeric Experiment ◽  
The Interest Rate ◽  
Borrowing Cost

Online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is an emerging financial mode that combines the Internet with private lending to provide unsecured lending among individuals. The interest rate and risk depend on online lenders and borrowers’ behavior choices and game in the context of P2P lending. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary behavior forecasting model for online participants based on the risk preference behavior of lenders and the credit choice of borrowers. We highlight four evolutionary equilibrium states of online lenders and borrowers’ behavior and their effects on the risk of online P2P lending platforms. We run a numeric experiment using the Paipaidai platform in China as a case and find that the evolutionary behavior of online lenders and borrowers is determined by the mutual effect of the interest rate, information gathering cost, borrowing cost, and yield rate. This paper uses evolutionary game methodology to analyze online P2P lending behavior in China and explores P2P fund success from the dual perspective of lenders and borrowers.

scholarly journals DISINTERMEDIASI FUNGSI PERBANKAN DI INDONESIA PASCA KRISIS 1997 : Faktor Permintaan Atau Penawaran Kredit, Sebuah Pendekatan Dengan Model Disequilibrium

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-78
Author(s):  
Harmanta Harmanta ◽  
Dr. Mahyus Ekananda
Keyword(s):  
Maximum Likelihood ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Likelihood Estimation ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Credit Crunch ◽  
Switching Regression ◽  
Credit Supply ◽  
Credit Demand

The goal of this paper is to analyze the determinants of bank credit declining, whether is dominated by the supply or the credit demand, post the financial crisis in Indonesia. This paper is a sort of New Keynesian approach, which pre assume the imperfectness of the credit market and hence create disequilibrium.Using the switching regression model and Maximum Likelihood Estimation to determine the probability of supply or demand determination, the result shows the existence of excess demand of credit during the crisis period, 1997/ 1998, confirming the credit crunch situation. After the crisis, the condition is reversed, where the credit supply is higher than the credit demand. The two findings implicitely shows the inflexibility of interest rate to equalize the credit market.JEL: D43, D82, E44, E51Keywords : Disintermediasi, kredit, disequilibrium, maximum likelihood, persamaan simultan, switching regression

scholarly journals PENGHINDARAN RISIKO KREDIT INVESTASI OLEH DEBITUR DI INDONESIA PASCA KRISIS 1997

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aloysius Deno Hervino
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Real Interest Rate ◽  
National Income ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Distributed Lag ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run

This research aimed to estimate the short run and long run (steady state) model on credit market, which influenced on risk hindering behavior by debtor, and taking banking regulation into model as a shock. Analyzing on investment credit market is related with asymmetric information problem and dynamic decision. This research was using Autoregressive Distributed Lag Error Correction Model (ARDL-ECM) to analyze this behavior because all variables were integrated on different level. In the short run, the debtor behaviors is only influenced by real interest rate on rupiah working capital, and in the long run his behavior influenced by real interest rate on rupiah working capital, and expected on real national income. But debtor behavior do not influence by real interest rate on rupiah investment credit in short and long run. Banking regulation do not influence the investment credit risk hindering behavior on debtor. On average, every change in explanatory variables need 24 days by debtor to adjust his behavior on investment credit market.

scholarly journals PENGHINDARAN RISIKO KREDIT INVESTASI OLEH DEBITUR DI INDONESIA PASCA KRISIS 1997

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 114
Author(s):  
Aloysius Deno Hervino
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Real Interest Rate ◽  
National Income ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Distributed Lag ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run

This research aimed to estimate the short run and long run (steady state) model on credit market, which influenced on risk hindering behavior by debtor, and taking banking regulation into model as a shock. Analyzing on investment credit market is related with asymmetric information problem and dynamic decision. This research was using Autoregressive Distributed Lag Error Correction Model (ARDL-ECM) to analyze this behavior because all variables were integrated on different level. In the short run, the debtor behaviors is only influenced by real interest rate on rupiah working capital, and in the long run his behavior influenced by real interest rate on rupiah working capital, and expected on real national income. But debtor behavior do not influence by real interest rate on rupiah investment credit in short and long run. Banking regulation do not influence the investment credit risk hindering behavior on debtor. On average, every change in explanatory variables need 24 days by debtor to adjust his behavior on investment credit market.

Regulatory Developments in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Lending to Combat Frauds

2021 ◽  
pp. 172-194
Author(s):  
Poshan Yu ◽  
Yingzi Hu ◽  
Maimoona Waseem ◽  
Abdul Rafay
Keyword(s):  
Case Report ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Theoretical Contribution ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
The Us ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
The Uk

Internet lending is a unique form of the credit market for bypassing banks in which borrowers generate online microloans without leverage or intermediation from financial institutions. Unlike the UK and the US, the Chinese P2P lending market is broader. Although the regulations concerning P2P lending are more comprehensive since 2015, there remains some regulatory gaps and failures, thus identifying these remaining regulatory gaps can help perfect the regulatory framework. This chapter provides a more detailed analysis and an examination of the Chinese legal framework related to P2P lending and identifying the vacuums in the existing framework. The theoretical contribution is primarily to the implications of the latest development of regulatory changes and the established individual credit reference system in China. Furthermore, the chapter also discovered three new regulatory vacuums (i.e., platform exit, a case report of financial crime, and consumer education), thus concluding with detailed insights on future approach towards perfecting the regulatory framework.

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