Learning from Past Mistakes The US Patent System and International Trade Agreements

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Feldman
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Patent System ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
The Us

Energy reform will hit investor confidence in Mexico

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
The United States ◽  
Energy Prices ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Investor Confidence ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
The Government ◽  
Energy Reform

Significance The government will appeal the rulings, which follow action by renewables firms. With constitutional battles over energy investments already unfolding, the future of Mexico’s energy framework has been thrown into turmoil. Impacts Increasing energy prices will probably push inflation above Banxico’s upper target limit of 4%. AMLO’s apparent disregard for international trade agreements will strain relations with the United States. AMLO’s pro-austerity fiscal stance could take a toll on his popularity.

scholarly journals International trade agreements and bargaining

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuyi Fang
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Real World ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
The World

In this dissertation, I provide a compelling explanation about why the World Trade Organization (WTO) permits retaliation only after a lengthy delay. I then explain why it usually rejects requests for retaliation (or a reciprocal withdrawal of concessions) in other related inter- national agreements. Next, I consider a more general problem about agents negotiating over an allocation of some surplus. This multilateral bargaining model could be applied to international trade or many real-world negotiations. I begin by taking a dynamic mechanism design approach and analyze the welfare effects among same-sector retaliation with and without delay as well as cross-sector retaliation with and without delay. I show that a retaliation with delay mechanism generates higher welfare and supports a higher self-enforcing level of cooperation than does a retaliation without delay mechanism. I demonstrate that under certain conditions, a same-sector retaliation mechanism generates higher welfare and supports a higher self-enforcing level of cooperation than does a cross-sector retaliation mechanism. All the above results are showing to hold for several different stochastic process of how a state of the world evolves. I then consider a more general case of bargaining where the size of the surplus is endogenized. In my model of the first two chapters after the introduction, although the size of the surplus varies across time, it still evolves in a stochastic manner. In many real-world negotiations, however, a surplus is usually created by players and each player may have certain power to influence a recognition process. Hence, my main innovation in the last chapter is to allow a surplus as well as recognition probabilities to be endogenously determined by players' actions. I assume that players' actions can have either persistent or transitory effects on a bargaining process. I compare the equilibrium outcomes under different voting rules and show that when a competition becomes less intensive (i.e., a proposal needs the consents of more players), it raises social welfare while it makes a free-ride problem more severe.

Due Diligence in International Trade Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 312-328
Author(s):  
Markus Krajewski
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Trade Regime ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law

This chapter assesses and analyses elements of due diligence in existing international trade agreements. It highlights due diligence obligations in this field, such as obligations to cooperate, to negotiate in good faith, or to notify about measures which could be harmful to other countries. The chapter also discusses elements applicable to the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements, especially with regard to the requirements of human rights and sustainable development impact assessments. The chapter argues that, even though due diligence is not a term of art in international trade law, it could be seen as a cornerstone of the international trade regime.

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