scholarly journals Multi-Winner Scoring Election Methods: Condorcet Consistency and Paradoxes

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mostapha Diss ◽  
Ahmed Doghmi
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Consistency

scholarly journals Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes

Public Choice ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 169 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 97-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mostapha Diss ◽  
Ahmed Doghmi
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Consistency

scholarly journals Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restricted Sets of Utility Functions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Lederer
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Social Decision ◽  
Classic Result ◽  
U Value ◽  
Social Decision Schemes ◽  
Fundamental Requirement ◽  
Condorcet Consistency

When aggregating preferences of multiple agents, strategyproofness is a fundamental requirement. For randomized voting rules, so-called social decision schemes (SDSs), strategyproofness is usually formalized with the help of utility functions. A classic result shown by Gibbard in 1977 characterizes the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with respect to all utility functions and shows that these SDSs are either indecisive or unfair. For finding more insights into the trade-off between strategyproofness and decisiveness, we propose the notion of U-strategyproofness which requires that only voters with a utility function in the set U cannot manipulate. In particular, we show that if the utility functions in U value the best alternative much more than other alternatives, there are U-strategyproof SDSs that choose an alternative with probability 1 whenever all but k voters rank it first. We also prove for rank-based SDSs that this large gap in the utilities is required to be strategyproof and that the gap must increase in k. On the negative side, we show that U-strategyproofness is incompatible with Condorcet-consistency if U satisfies minimal symmetry conditions and there are at least four alternatives. For three alternatives, the Condorcet rule can be characterized based on U-strategyproofness for the set U containing all equi-distant utility functions.

scholarly journals Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 229-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sébastien Courtin ◽  
Mathieu Martin ◽  
Bertrand Tchantcho
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Consistency

Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

2009 ◽  
Vol 144 (3) ◽  
pp. 1278-1299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parimal Kanti Bag ◽  
Hamid Sabourian ◽  
Eyal Winter
Keyword(s):  
Multi Stage ◽  
Sequential Elimination ◽  
Condorcet Consistency

The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 685-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Baharad ◽  
Shmuel Nitzan
Keyword(s):  
Borda Rule ◽  
Condorcet Consistency

scholarly journals Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes

2019 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
pp. 36-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Kasper ◽  
Hans Peters ◽  
Dries Vermeulen
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Consistency
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