scholarly journals Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan Candogan ◽  
Markos Epitropou ◽  
Rakesh Vohra
Keyword(s):  
Network Flow ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Trading Networks

scholarly journals Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan Candogan ◽  
Markos Epitropou ◽  
Rakesh V. Vohra
Keyword(s):  
Network Flow ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Flow Problem ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Bilateral Contracts ◽  
Submodular Flow ◽  
Competitive Equilibria ◽  
Trading Networks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Shed Light

This paper considers a network of agents who trade indivisible goods or services via bilateral contracts. Under a substitutability assumption on preferences, it is known that a competitive equilibrium exists. In “Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach,” Candogan, Epitropou, and Vohra show how to determine equilibrium outcomes as a generalized submodular flow problem. Existence of a competitive equilibrium and its equivalence to seemingly weaker notions of stability follow directly from the optimality conditions of the flow problem. The formulation enables the authors to perform comparative statics with respect to the number of buyers, sellers, and trades. In particular, they are able to shed light on the impact of new trading opportunities on the equilibrium trades, prices, and surpluses. In addition, they present algorithms for finding competitive equilibria in trading networks and testing stability.

scholarly journals Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks

2013 ◽  
Vol 121 (5) ◽  
pp. 966-1005 ◽  
Author(s):  
John William Hatfield ◽  
Scott Duke Kominers ◽  
Alexandru Nichifor ◽  
Michael Ostrovsky ◽  
Alexander Westkamp
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Trading Networks

Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas M Gale ◽  
Shachar Kariv
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Equilibrium Behavior ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Market Friction ◽  
Pricing Behavior ◽  
Trading Networks ◽  
Pricing Rule

This paper reports an experimental study of trading networks. Networks are incomplete in the sense that each trader can only exchange assets with a limited number of other traders. The greater the incompleteness of the network, the more intermediation is required to transfer the assets between initial and final owners. The uncertainty of trade in networks constitutes a potentially important market friction. Nevertheless, we find the pricing behavior observed in the laboratory converges to competitive equilibrium behavior in a variety of treatments. However, the rate of convergence varies depending on the network, pricing rule, and payoff function. (JEL C91, C92, G10, G19)

Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (5) ◽  
pp. 256-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy T. Fox
Keyword(s):  
Structural Model ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Pairwise Stability ◽  
Matching Games ◽  
Matching Game ◽  
Theoretic Solution ◽  
Trading Networks

Structural estimation of matching games with transferable utility, including matching games of trading networks and many-to-many matching, is increasingly popular in empirical work. I explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game. One decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model. I discuss pairwise stability, competitive equilibrium, and noncooperative games such as auctions. Another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents. I explore other issues as well.

scholarly journals Chain stability in trading networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-234
Author(s):  
John William Hatfield ◽  
Scott Duke Kominers ◽  
Alexandru Nichifor ◽  
Michael Ostrovsky ◽  
Alexander Westkamp
Keyword(s):  
General Model ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Pairwise Stability ◽  
Bilateral Contracts ◽  
Aggregate Supply ◽  
Trading Networks ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Stability Concept

In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two‐sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully substitutable and satisfy the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. In the special case of trading networks with transferable utility, an outcome is consistent with competitive equilibrium if and only if it is chain stable.

Power generation scheduling through use of generalised network flow programming

1991 ◽  
Vol 138 (1) ◽  
pp. 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.E. Rice ◽  
W.M. Grady ◽  
W.G. Lesso ◽  
A.H. Noyola ◽  
M.E. Connolly
Keyword(s):  
Power Generation ◽  
Network Flow ◽  
Generation Scheduling ◽  
Network Flow Programming

Reliability Comparison Between Redundant Repairable Network Flow Systems

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-59
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Yusuf ◽  
◽  
Bashir Yusuf
Keyword(s):  
Network Flow ◽  
Flow Systems
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