Labor Unions and Payout Policy: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis

Author(s):  
Jie He ◽  
Xuan Tian ◽  
Huan Yang
2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 553-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qianqian Huang ◽  
Feng Jiang ◽  
Erik Lie ◽  
Tingting Que

We find evidence that labor unions affect chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. First, we find that firms with strong unions pay their CEOs less. The negative effect is robust to various tests for endogeneity, including cross-sectional variations and a regression discontinuity design. Second, we find that CEO compensation is curbed before union contract negotiations, especially when the compensation is discretionary and the unions have a strong bargaining position. Third, we report that curbing CEO compensation mitigates the chance of a labor strike, thus providing a rationale for firms to pay CEOs less when facing strong unions.


1977 ◽  
Vol 41 (11) ◽  
pp. 660-665
Author(s):  
JH Oaks ◽  
DM Fox ◽  
JJ Valter
Keyword(s):  

1968 ◽  
Vol 52 (6, Pt.1) ◽  
pp. 447-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Alsikafi ◽  
Walfrid J. Jokinen ◽  
S. Lee Spray ◽  
George S. Tracy
Keyword(s):  

1936 ◽  
Vol 5 (24) ◽  
pp. 261-261
Author(s):  
M. S. F.
Keyword(s):  

CFA Digest ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-19
Author(s):  
Spencer L. Klein
Keyword(s):  

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