A Revelation Mechanism for Soft Information Under Moral Hazard

I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. This affects the shape and properties of the optimal contract, which fails to elicit truthful revelation in all states. In this setup audit and transfer become strategic complements; this is rooted in the nonseparability of the problem. (JEL D82, D86)

Download Full-text

Moral Hazard with Discrete Soft Information

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1999803 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Guillaume Roger

Keyword(s):

Moral Hazard ◽

Soft Information

Download Full-text

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽

10.32678/alqalam.v33i1.384 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 33 (1) ◽

pp. 46

Author(s):

Aswadi Lubis

Keyword(s):

High Risk ◽

Asymmetric Information ◽

Human Resources ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Agency Problem ◽

Agency Problems ◽

Islamic Banking ◽

The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Download Full-text

ASPEK ETIK DAN SISTEMIK DALAM EKONOMI DAN BISNIS ISLAM

ALQALAM ◽

10.32678/alqalam.v31i1.1110 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 31 (1) ◽

pp. 187

Author(s):

Budi Harsanto

Keyword(s):

Financial Crisis ◽

Business Ethics ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Global Financial Crisis ◽

Financial Institution ◽

Research Question ◽

Academic Journals ◽

Lehman Brothers ◽

The World ◽

The Global Financial Crisis

The fall of Enron, Lehman Brothers and other major financial institution in the world make researchers conduct various studies about crisis. The research question in this study is, from Islamic economics and business standpoint, why the global financial crisis can happen repeatedly. The purpose is to contribute ideas regarding Islamic viewpoint linked with the global financial crisis. The methodology used is a theoretical-reflective to various article published in academic journals and other intellectual resources with relevant themes. There are lots of analyses on the causes of the crisis. For discussion purposes, the causes divide into two big parts namely ethics and systemic. Ethics contributed to the crisis by greed and moral hazard as a theme that almost always arises in the study of the global financial crisis. Systemic means that the crisis can only be overcome with a major restructuring of the system. Islamic perspective on these two aspect is diametrically different. At ethics side, there is exist direction to obtain blessing in economics and business activities. At systemic side, there is rule of halal and haram and a set of mechanism of economics system such as the concept of ownership that will early prevent the seeds of crisis. Keywords: Islamic economics and business, business ethics, financial crisis

Download Full-text

Moral Hazard and LIBOR

CFA Magazine ◽

10.2469/cfm.v23.n5.3 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 23 (5) ◽

pp. 20-21

Author(s):

Osman Ghani

Keyword(s):

Moral Hazard

Download Full-text