Dividend Smoothing in a Multi-Period Model of Signaling with Moral Hazard

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan V. S. Douglas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Dividend Smoothing ◽  
Period Model

scholarly journals Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring

10.3982/qe564 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 693-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ofer Setty
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
The Government ◽  
Monitoring Precision ◽  
Period Model

I model job‐search monitoring in the optimal unemployment insurance framework, in which job‐search effort is the worker's private information. In the model, monitoring provides costly information upon which the government conditions unemployment benefits. Using a simple one‐period model with two effort levels, I show analytically that the monitoring precision increases and the utility spread decreases if and only if the inverse of the worker's utility in consumption has a convex derivative. The quantitative analysis that follows extends the model by allowing a continuous effort and separations from employment. That analysis highlights two conflicting economic forces affecting the optimal precision of monitoring with respect to the generosity of the welfare system: higher promised utility is associated not only with a higher cost of moral hazard, but also with lower effort and lower value of employment. The result is an inverse U‐shaped precision profile with respect to promised utility.

scholarly journals Effects of the Sharing Economy on Sequential Innovation Products

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenfeng Liu ◽  
Jian Feng ◽  
Jinfeng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
New Product ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Use Value ◽  
Previous Period ◽  
Sequential Innovation ◽  
Insignificant Effect ◽  
Period Model

The emergence of the sharing economy has affected consumers and traditional manufacturers. We focus on product sharing and analyze its impacts on the manufacturer that offers sequential innovation products. We develop a two-period model in which a monopoly manufacturer sells an old product and introduces a new product in each period; in the same period, an owner who bought a product for self-use from the manufacturer in the previous period may rent the product out because of the low self-use value in this period. Our analysis reveals that the sharing market increases or decreases the manufacturer’s profit, and this is mainly determined by the moral hazard cost and the salvage value of sharing products. Furthermore, the sharing market has an insignificant effect on the upgrading of products, but there is a bumping-down effect on old products’ sales. Finally, the effect of the sharing market on the revenue of the owner and the sharing platform mostly depends on the risk of moral hazard, and it also affects the manufacturer’s product rollover strategy.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

ASPEK ETIK DAN SISTEMIK DALAM EKONOMI DAN BISNIS ISLAM

ALQALAM ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Budi Harsanto
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Academic Journals ◽  
Lehman Brothers ◽  
The World ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The fall of Enron, Lehman Brothers and other major financial institution in the world make researchers conduct various studies about crisis. The research question in this study is, from Islamic economics and business standpoint, why the global financial crisis can happen repeatedly. The purpose is to contribute ideas regarding Islamic viewpoint linked with the global financial crisis. The methodology used is a theoretical-reflective to various article published in academic journals and other intellectual resources with relevant themes. There are lots of analyses on the causes of the crisis. For discussion purposes, the causes divide into two big parts namely ethics and systemic. Ethics contributed to the crisis by greed and moral hazard as a theme that almost always arises in the study of the global financial crisis. Systemic means that the crisis can only be overcome with a major restructuring of the system. Islamic perspective on these two aspect is diametrically different. At ethics side, there is exist direction to obtain blessing in economics and business activities. At systemic side, there is rule of halal and haram and a set of mechanism of economics system such as the concept of ownership that will early prevent the seeds of crisis. Keywords: Islamic economics and business, business ethics, financial crisis 

Moral Hazard and LIBOR

CFA Magazine ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 20-21
Author(s):  
Osman Ghani
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard

HUBUNGAN BOARD DAN KOMITE AUDIT TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fivi Anggraini
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

Earnings management is the moral hazard problem of manager that adses because of the conflict of interest between the manager as agent and the stakeholder and the owner as principal. The behavior of earnings management will immediately influence the reported earning. The aims of this research at examining the relationship of board and audit committe to earnings management. The samples of this research is all of companies member Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) in the years of 2003-2006 which were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The results of this study show that (1) the proportion of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (2) competence of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (3) the size of board had significant relationship to earning management, (4) the proportion of independent directors on the audit committe had not significant relationship to earning management, and (5) competence of members of the audit committe had significant relationship to earning management.

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