The Origins of Public Choice and Virginia Political Economy: What Might Arthur Lovejoy Have Thought?

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice

The Political Economy of Trust

2019 ◽  
pp. 627-648
Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Social Trust ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Reverse Causality ◽  
Quality Of Institutions

This chapter provides a selective survey of the literature on social trust in public choice and political economy. It outlines the empirical evidence and discusses theoretical channels through which social trust can affect the quality of institutions and policies, and the conditions under which such mechanisms are likely to work. It also addresses the discussion of reverse causality, that is, whether good institutions or policies actively create trust. It then discusses whether trust can be created or destroyed by activist government policy or accidental institutional changes. Its main focus is on the set of theories and evidence of the association between social trust and institutions of governance.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 519-541
Author(s):  
Luna Bellani ◽  
Heinrich Ursprung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
The Public ◽  
Generic Models ◽  
Redistribution Policy ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

The authors review the literature on the public-choice analysis of redistribution policies. They restrict the discussion to redistribution in democracies and focus on policies that are pursued with the sole objective of redistributing initial endowments. Since generic models of redistribution in democracies lack equilibria, one needs to introduce structure-inducing rules to arrive at a models whose behavior realistically portrays observed redistribution patterns. These rules may relate to the economic relationships, political institutions, or to firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of voters. The chapter surveys the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.

Constitutional Rules of Overlapping Taxation among Multi–Tiered Governments*

2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-182
Author(s):  
Akira Yokoyama
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Constitutional Rule ◽  
Tax Base ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Rate Constraints

Abstract The literature of public choice and constitutional political economy argues for fiscal decentralization and for enlarging the tax and spending powers of sub-national tiers of government. Numerous investigations of vertical tax externalities caused by overlapping and uncoordinated taxation appeared in the 1990s after Brennan - Buchanan [1980] and Flowers [1988]. The literature, however, seldom discussed constitutional rules governing overlapping taxation in federal or multi-tiered governmental structures. This paper closes that gap in the literature. It explicates the criteria for selecting constitutional rules governing overlapping taxation and demonstrates that a competitive tax regime constrained by a maximum tax rate surpasses a competitive tax regime without rate constraints as a constitutional rule. It concludes that constraining maximum tax rates applicable to any tax base is highly important in multi-tiered governmental structures.

scholarly journals Constitutional political economy by Hayek: The conflict between democracy and liberalism

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 18-29
Author(s):  
Andrey Zaostrovtsev
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Final Conclusion ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Electoral Democracy

This paper analyzes the constitutional political economy of Friedrich von Hayek in the context of the well-known contradiction between democracy and liberalism. It is alleged that Hayek at about the same time as researchers from the school of public choice developed the concept of failures of a democratic state, which remains relevant today. Among such failures are subordination to group interests, excessive redistributive activity (growth of the welfare state), legal positivism as a consequence of the unlimited will of the majority. A draft constitutional structure developed by Hayek is considered, aimed at reducing the influence of electoral democracy in order to preserve a free society. The differences in the approaches of Hayek and theorists of public choice to constitutional construction are especially emphasized. For the former, the constitution (despite accusations of constructivism due to the proposed ideal of the constitutional structure) is still a product of evolution. For the latter, it is the result of rational choice under the famous veil of ignorance. The paper shows that Hayek was one of the first to pay attention to formal and informal institutions (moral principles) and showed the crucial role of the latter to characterize the conflict between democracy and liberalism. At the same time, the role of Hayek is noted as one of the first researchers who drew attention to such important aspects of the institutional theory as a competition of institutions and significant restrictions on the international import of institutions due to the impossibility of constructing informal institutions. The final conclusion of the work is that electoral democracy does not destroy constitutional freedoms only if the latter are firmly rooted in public consciousness. Otherwise, their formal proclamation does not mean their guaranteed existence.

scholarly journals Model of public choice and political rent

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-57
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Bezat-Jarzebowska ◽  
WÅ‚odzimierz Rembisz ◽  
Agata Sielska
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Benefits And Costs ◽  
Selection Of

It can be assumed that the scope of agricultural policy and connected with its financial streams are not accidental. Selection of a particular, policy defines a mechanism in which the benefits and costs are combined. Such an effort of describing and ex plaining the mechanism was presented in the paper. We use the concept of a public choice model. Issues of including political (or admin istrative) interest in defining and shaping the policy are incorporated into the models of public choice. The authors assumed the rationality of decision makers and their goal to maximize their own utility. The analysis presented in the paper is some reference to one of the trends of political economy, according to which the emphasis is on the voters’ behaviour.   Keywords: Public choice, political rent, agricultural policy, political economic  analysis

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