scholarly journals Strategy Proofness and Unanimity in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mostapha Diss ◽  
Ahmed Doghmi ◽  
Abdelmonaim Tlidi
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberr ◽  
Dolors Berga-Colom ◽  
Bernardo Moreno

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Dolors Berga ◽  
Bernardo Moreno

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)


Public Choice ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Marie Blin ◽  
Mark A. Satterthwaite

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Satterthwaite
Keyword(s):  

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