Exclusive Dealing: Loyalty Discounts Should Always be Legal, Except in Case of High Entry Barriers

Author(s):  
Magdalena Laskowska
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas H. Ginsburg ◽  
Joshua D. Wright ◽  
Lindsey Edwards
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 787-823
Author(s):  
Claude Samson

This paper deals with the exclusive sale contract or solus agreement. Its first part identifies some characteristic features of this type of agreement, which quite often is not only aimed at regulating the exercise of trade, but also serves as a technique of market organization and economic power concentration. The impact of the increasing currency of such commercial practices on the free market justifies consideration of the various forms of control that can be exercised by public authorities in order to preserve free competition. Control can be achieved through the judiciary applying concepts such as public order in civil law or public policy at common law. However, in view of the courts' reluctance to interfere with such instances of private economic power and their indifference towards the economic inequities inherent in such agreements for the distributor, legislative intervention has become necessary to protect the free market. Thus the Combines Investigation Act was amended in 1976 to allow regulation of commercial practices such as refusal to deal, consignment selling, exclusive dealing, market restriction and tied selling.


1981 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 405 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Baumol ◽  
Robert D. Willig

Significance These are: artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum computing, genetics, biotechnology, neuroscience and aerospace. Impacts It is not always useful to view technological competition between China and the West as a ‘race’. China will likely burn significant capital just to achieve parity with advanced countries, and may never achieve it. Low margins will encourage protectionism and import substitution, with an impact on efficiency and productivity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-147
Author(s):  
Aleksey Zazdravnykh

The article analyzes the practical aspects of the functioning of some barriers to entry in the era of digital transformation of industry markets. It is noted that under the influence of digitalization processes, both positive changes in the mechanism of market operation are recorded, as well as a number of negative circumstances that have become a serious challenge for antitrust agencies. Control of big data, initial investment in digital infrastructure, and broad technological capabilities of digital blocking of users, against the background of powerful network effects and pronounced economies of scale, carry the potential for significant growth in the market power of individual firms. The article substantiates that such trends theoretically pose a significant threat to competition, and can form new types of entry barriers. At the same time, practical arguments are presented that indicate the ambiguity of this position.


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