scholarly journals Frictions in Internet Auctions with Many Traders: A Counterexample

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Donna ◽  
Pablo Schenone ◽  
Greg Veramendi
Keyword(s):  
Internet Auctions

scholarly journals Internet Auctions with Many Traders

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael NMI Peters ◽  
Sergei Severinov
Keyword(s):  
Internet Auctions

scholarly journals Reputation and Internet Auctions: eBay and Beyond

2004 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Snijders ◽  
Richard Zijdeman
Keyword(s):  
Online Auctions ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Internet Auctions ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms

AbstractEach day, a countless number of items is sold through online auction sites such as eBay and Ricardo. Though abuse is being reported more and more, transactions seem to be relatively hassle free. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the sites’ reputation mechanisms prevent opportunistic behavior. To analyze this issue, we first summarize and extend the mechanisms that affect the probability of sale of an item and its price. We then try to replicate the results as found in four recent papers on online auctions. Our analyses reveal that (1) it makes sense to differentiate between ‘power sellers’ and the less regular users, (2) there are variables that have an effect on sales that are often not controlled for, (3) one should carefully consider how reputation is operationalized, ( 4) neglecting heteroscedastidty in the data can have serious consequences, and (5) there is some support indicating that effects differ across auction sites.

A Review of Single-Item Internet Auction Literature and a Model for Future Research

2011 ◽  
pp. 3987-4012
Author(s):  
Jeff Baker ◽  
Jaeki Song
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Conceptual Model ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Internet Auction ◽  
Internet Auctions ◽  
Single Item ◽  
Comprehensive List ◽  
Future Work

Internet auctions have received a considerable amount of attention from researchers. We review recent empirical literature pertaining to single-item Internet auctions and observe that existing work has examined the roles of the auctioneer, bidder, and seller in Internet auctions. As this stream of research matures, research will necessarily move from concept discovery and process explanation to theory deepening. As a first step towards synthesis of findings in Internet auctions, we compile a comprehensive list of the various factors that have been examined in empirical studies and note their general impact upon auction outcome. Based upon this extant research, we propose a conceptual model of Internet auctions as a framework for structuring future work into Internet auctions. We then note the existing economic, psychological, sociological, and cognitive theoretical bases for work on Internet auctions. We conclude by highlighting the potential for behavioral economics to bring unity to Internet auction research and by calling researchers to engage in the work of forging a comprehensive theory of Internet auctions.

Nibbling, Sniping, and the Role of Uncertainty in Second-Price, Hard-Close Internet Auctions

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Carl S. Bozman ◽  
Matthew Q. McPherson
Keyword(s):  
Internet Auctions

Network Effects and the Evolution of Internet Auctions

2011 ◽  
pp. 71-87
Author(s):  
S. Park
Keyword(s):  
Web Site ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
The Other ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Internet Auctions ◽  
Auction Mechanisms ◽  
Entry Behavior

Based on the weekly data of listings and Web site usage of eBay and Yahoo!Auctions, as well as fee schedules and available auction mechanisms, this chapter provides empirical support of the network effect in Internet auctions: A seller’s expected auction revenue increases with page views per listing on one hand and increased listings raise page views per listing on the other hand. The existence of the network effect between Web site usage and listings explains the first mover’s advantage and the dominance of eBay even with higher fees in the Internet auctions market. Our empirical findings also highlight unique features of Internet auctions, especially in the entry behavior of potential bidders into specific auctions, inviting more theoretical studies of the market microstructure of Internet auctions.

Nibbling, Sniping, and the Role of Uncertainty in Second-Price, Hard-Close Internet Auctions

2009 ◽  
pp. 1526-1539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Carl S. Bozman ◽  
Matthew Q. McPherson
Keyword(s):  
Web Sites ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Buyer Behavior ◽  
Internet Auctions ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Auction Format

Internet auctions have gained widespread appeal as an efficient and effective means of buying and selling goods and services. This study examines buyer behavior on eBay, one of the most wellknown Internet auction Web sites. eBay’s auction format is similar to that of a second-price, hardclose auction, which gives a rational participant an incentive to submit a bid that is equal to his or her maximum willingness to pay. But while traditional second-price, hard-close auctions assume that participants have reliable information about their own and other bidders’ reservation prices, eBay participants usually do not. This raises the possibility that eBay participants may adapt their bidding strategies and not actually bid their reservation prices because of increased uncertainty. In this article, we empirically examine the bidding patterns of online auction participants and compare our findings to the behavior of bidders in more conventional auction settings.

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