Sibling Rivalry? The Impact of Interdivisional Cooperation and Competition on Market Entry Following an Industry Shock

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Wu ◽  
Mo Chen ◽  
Vikas A. Aggarwal
Keyword(s):  
Market Entry ◽  
Sibling Rivalry ◽  
Cooperation And Competition ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Market Liberalization, Regulatory Uncertainty, and Firm Investment

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Baumann ◽  
Tim Friehe
Keyword(s):  
Market Entry ◽  
Market Liberalization ◽  
Firm Investment ◽  
Labor Costs ◽  
Regulatory Uncertainty ◽  
Internal Investment ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.

scholarly journals The Role Of Reputation In Market Entry: Evidence From French Public Procurement

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 805-814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Kachour ◽  
Olivier Mamavi ◽  
Haithem Nagati
Keyword(s):  
Market Entry ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Public Markets ◽  
Free Competition ◽  
French Firm ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Impact

This article studies the impact of reputation on market entry in public procurement. Based on the observation of a French firm with a strong reputation, we demonstrate a significant effect of the difference in public contracts won between date t-1 and date t. Our model provides empirical proof that selection of a supplier with a strong reputation does not hinder entry in public procurement nor does it prevent free competition. This result thus questions the justification for the European Union regulation that limits the use of information on past performance to select suppliers in public markets. The findings also suggest that reputation mechanisms can help reduce uncertainty during contract execution. 

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN HISTORY-DEPENDENT PARRONDO'S GAME ON NETWORKS

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (03) ◽  
pp. 323-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
YE YE ◽  
NENG-GANG XIE ◽  
LIN-GANG WANG ◽  
LU WANG ◽  
YU-WAN CEN
Keyword(s):  
Degree Distribution ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Behavioral Adaptation ◽  
Cooperation And Competition ◽  
History Of ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Average Fitness

The paper studies a multi-agent Parrondo's game with history dependence. With the complex networks as the spatial carrier, the adaptation of cooperation and competition (coopetition for short) behaviors is analyzed and the impact of the degree distribution of the heterogeneity on the behavioral adaptation is investigated. The multi-agent Parrondo's game consists of a zero-sum game between individuals and a negative-sum game between individuals and environment based on the history of the game. In terms of relations of the zero-sum game, two behavioral patterns are determined: cooperation and competition. The simulation results show that: (1) Cooperation and competition in any forms are the adaptive behaviors. The coopetition behavior results in the variety of winning and losing states of the history, which makes the population develop toward the beneficial direction where nature affects. The positive average fitness of the population represents the paradoxical feature that the Parrondo's game is counterintuitive, (2) for the cooperation pattern, the average fitness of the population is the largest under Barabási–Albert (BA) network which is conducive to cooperation, (3) the heterogeneity has a positive impact on cooperation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document