Financal Frictions and Policy Cooperation: A Case with Monopolistic Banking and Staggered Loan Contracts

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
Yuki Teranishi
Keyword(s):  
Loan Contracts

Financial Folly and Spain’s Black Legend

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Great Flexibility ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Historical Tradition ◽  
Black Legend ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
The Relationship

This epilogue argues that Castile was solvent throughout Philip II's reign. A complex web of contractual obligations designed to ensure repayment governed the relationship between the king and his bankers. The same contracts allowed great flexibility for both the Crown and bankers when liquidity was tight. The risk of potential defaults was not a surprise; their likelihood was priced into the loan contracts. As a consequence, virtually every banking family turned a profit over the long term, while the king benefited from their services to run the largest empire that had yet existed. The epilogue then looks at the economic history version of Spain's Black Legend. The economic history version of the Black Legend emerged from a combination of two narratives: a rich historical tradition analyzing the decline of Spain as an economic and military power from the seventeenth century onward, combined with new institutional analysis highlighting the unconstrained power of the monarch.

Lending to the Borrower from Hell

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
The United States ◽  
Philip Ii ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intelligent Model ◽  
New Evidence

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.

Delayed Repayment of Corporate Loans in the European Union: Can the Late Payment Directive be Applied to Loan Contracts?

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Magdalena Gruber
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Loan Contracts

Abstract This paper examines the Late Payment Directive of the European Union and seeks to answer the question of whether the provisions of the Directive apply to loan contracts in corporate transactions. The paper first describes and analyses the Late Pay­ment Directive and provides a comprehensive analysis of relevant arguments and legal sources. It then evaluates the different factors required by the Late Payment Directive and finally argues that the Late Payment Directive has to be applied to loan contracts and facility agreements, even if this is not explicitly foreseen in the Directive.

Credit Rationing and Heterogeneity in Corporate Loan Contracts

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Beyhaghi ◽  
Babak Mahmoudi ◽  
Ali Mohammadi
Keyword(s):  
Credit Rationing ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Corporate Loan

Proprietary information and the cost of bank debt

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
HyunJun Na
Keyword(s):  
Least Square ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Proprietary Information ◽  
Banking Deregulation ◽  
Interstate Banking ◽  
Innovative Firms ◽  
Bank Loan Contracts ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis study explores how the firm’s proprietary information has an impact on the bank loan contracts. It explains the propensity of using the competitive bid option (CBO) in the syndicate loans to solicit the best bid for innovative firms and how it changes based on industry competition and the degree of innovations. This research also examines how the interstate banking deregulation (Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act) in 1994 affected the private loan contracts for innovative borrowers.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses various econometric analyses. First, it uses the propensity score matching analysis to see the impact of patents on pricing terms. Second, it uses the two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis by implementing the litigation and non-NYSE variables. Finally, it studies the impact of the policy change of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 on the bank loan contracts.FindingsFirms with more proprietary information pays more annual facility fees but less other fees. The patents are the primary determinants of the usage of CBO in the syndicate loans to solicit the best bid. While innovative firms can have better contract conditions by the CBO, firms with more proprietary information will less likely to use the CBO option to minimize the leakage of private information and the severe monitoring from the banks. Finally, more proprietary information lowered the loan spread for firms dependent on the external capital after the interstate banking deregulation.Originality/valueThe findings of this research will help senior executives with responsibility for financing their innovative projects. In addition, these findings should prove helpful for the lawmakers to boost economies.

Enslaved Financing of Southern Industry: The Nesbitt Manufacturing Company of South Carolina, 1836–1850

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
SHARON ANN MURPHY
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Financial Assets ◽  
Market Exchange ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Company Stock ◽  
Antebellum Period ◽  
Manufacturing Company ◽  
Panic Of 1837

Incorporated on the eve of the Panic of 1837, the Nesbitt Manufacturing Company of South Carolina owned and hired enslaved individuals to labor in their ironworks, but they also leveraged the market value of this enslaved property by exchanging them for shares of company stock and offering them as collateral in loan contracts. These slaveholders actively experimented with increasingly sophisticated financial tools and institutions in order to facilitate investment, market exchange, and profit maximization within the system of enslavement. Although historians have examined the role of enslaved labor in industrial concerns, they have largely ignored their role in the financing of these operations. Understanding the multiple ways that southerners were turning enslaved property into liquid, flexible financial assets is essential to understanding the depth and breadth of the system of enslavement. In doing so, we can move beyond questions of whether slavery was compatible with industrialization specifically and capitalism more broadly, to an understanding of how slavery and capitalism interacted to promote southern economic development in the antebellum period. At the same time, the experience of the Nesbitt Company reveals the limits of enslaved financing. The aftermath of the Panic of 1837 demonstrated that the market value of enslaved property was much more volatile than enslavers cared to admit. Although southerners could often endure this volatility in the case of enslaved laborers working on plantations or in factories, it made the financialization of slavery a much riskier endeavor for an emerging industrial regime.

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