Board Structure in the UK and Germany: Convergence or Continuing Divergence?

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul L. Davies
Keyword(s):  
Board Structure ◽  
The Uk

6. Corporate governance—board structure and shareholder engagement

Company Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brenda Hannigan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Shareholder Engagement ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control

This chapter discusses corporate governance in publicly traded companies with widely dispersed shareholdings. Most shareholders are not involved in the management and control of a company's affairs. Thus, a separation usually develops between those who collectively own the company through their combined shareholdings (the shareholders) and those who manage it (the directors). Problems can arise from this separation of ownership and control as distance from the day-to-day running of the business makes it difficult for shareholders to restrain any managerial excesses. The starting point of good corporate governance is internal mechanisms (such as shareholders' rights and board structures). The discussions cover the UK corporate governance code, corporate governance requirement, board committees, and shareholder engagement.

Board structure: an empirical study of firms in Anglo-American governance environments

2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (7) ◽  
pp. 681-699 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.I. Muller-Kahle ◽  
Liu Wang ◽  
Jun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Resource Dependence Theory ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – With boards of directors playing both monitoring and guidance roles, the purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of board structure on firm value in large US and UK firms using the lenses of agency and resource dependence theories. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of firms in the USA and the UK from 2000 to 2007, the paper conducts a panel data analysis of the impact of board structure on firm value and examine the nuances of different governance environments. Findings – The paper finds distinct differences in the impact of board independence, board size, and outside director busyness on firm value between UK and US firms. Specifically, the paper finds that board independence, board size, and board busyness all have a significant positive impact on firm value in the UK. However, the paper finds no significant relationship between board independence and firm value among US firms. Both board size and board busyness are found to be positively associated with firm value in the USA. Social implications – The paper finds strong support for resource dependence theory in the UK but limited support for agency theory in the USA. Originality/value – This paper takes a multi-country approach to examining the impact of board structure on firm value.

Does corporate governance matter in determining CEO compensation in the publicly listed companies in New Zealand? An empirical investigation

2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Reddy ◽  
Sazali Abidin ◽  
Linjuan You
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010. Design/methodology/approach – Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance. Findings – After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Research limitations/implications – The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis. Practical implications – The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation. Originality/value – Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

scholarly journals Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 101-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saeed Akbar ◽  
Buthiena Kharabsheh ◽  
Jannine Poletti-Hughes ◽  
Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Corporate Risk

scholarly journals How does board structure impact on firm performance in the UK?

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Alqatan ◽  
Imad Chbib ◽  
Khaled Hussainey
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Significant Negative Correlation ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Uk

The aim of this paper is to examine whether or not the structure of the board of directors and, in particular, board size, independence and remuneration have an impact on firm performance. The sample examined is UK FTSE 100 non-financial companies using data from the period 2012 to 2015. A regression analysis has been used concluding a significant positive correlation between board remuneration and firm performance, namely Return on Assets and Tobin’s Q. The study also concluded a positive correlation between board size and ROA, and between board independence and Tobin’s Q. Additionally, a significant negative correlation between the control variables (i.e. company size and industry) and Return on Assets.

scholarly journals Target board structure and takeover-induced abnormal returns in the UK

2005 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Costas Constantinou ◽  
Lenos Trigeorgis ◽  
Nikos Vafeas
Keyword(s):  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
The Uk

We examine the link between board structure and bid-induced abnormal returns for a sample of 198 UK-based firms that became takeover targets between 1989 and 1998. As expected, takeover targets experience significant gains during the takeover announcement period. In line with a disciplinary explanation for takeovers, we find that target boards that are larger, with fewer independent directors, and a managing director chairman, experience more favorable announcement-period returns. Targets with more reputable directors and directors with greater ownership incentives, also experience more favorable announcement-period returns

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