Bank Payout Policy, Performance, and Insider Trading in the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cziraki ◽  
Christian Laux ◽  
Gyongyi Loranth
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Policy Performance

Economic Patriotism After the Crisis: Explaining Continuity and Change in European Securities Enforcement

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chase Foster
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Financial Centre ◽  
Continuity And Change ◽  
Financial Interests ◽  
Mixed Pattern ◽  
The Uk

Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, I find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. I conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (Story and Walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. Thus, in the UK, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. While the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of European-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v12i1.1233

scholarly journals ERRATUM ON THE ARTICLE ‘THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON INSIDER TRADING PROFITABILITY IN BELGIUM ’ (DOI: 10.3846/16111699.2011.652980)

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 432-432
Author(s):  
Debby Van Geyt ◽  
Philippe Van Cauwenberge ◽  
Heidi Vander Bauwhede
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
The Impact

"Erratum on the article ‘The impact of the financial crisis on insider trading profitability in Belgium’ (doi: 10.3846/16111699.2011.652980)." Journal of Business Econimics and Management, 14(2), p. 432

Insider trading during the 2008 financial crisis

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 301-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naser I. Abumustafa ◽  
Salah A. Nusair
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis

scholarly journals Economic Patriotism After the Crisis: Explaining Continuity and Change in European Securities Enforcement

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chase Foster
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Financial Centre ◽  
Continuity And Change ◽  
Financial Interests ◽  
Mixed Pattern ◽  
The Uk

Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, I find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. I conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (Story and Walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. Thus, in the UK, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. While the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of European-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches.

Payout Policy Trade-Offs and the Rise of 10b5-1 Preset Repurchase Plans

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (6) ◽  
pp. 2762-2786 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Bonaimé ◽  
Jarrad Harford ◽  
David Moore
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Financial Flexibility ◽  
Market Reactions ◽  
Company Stock ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Repurchase Announcements ◽  
Buy Back

We are the first to document and study the use of Rule 10b5-1 preset repurchase plans. Though the rule’s original intent was to clarify conditions for enforcing insider trading laws, generally thought to apply to individuals classified as firm insiders, we find strong use of the rule at the firm level to repurchase company stock. We exploit this new and widespread form of payout to examine an issue at the core of payout decisions—the trade-off between commitment and financial flexibility. Relative to open market repurchases, preset plans provide an expanded repurchase window and increased legal cover, albeit at the cost of reducing repurchase flexibility and the option to time repurchases. These costs and benefits are significantly associated with Rule 10b5-1 adoption: Firms with alternative sources of financial flexibility are more likely to precommit to a repurchase plan, as are firms with a history of poor repurchase timing and firms constrained by blackout windows. Consistent with preset plans signaling commitment, Rule 10b5-1 repurchase announcements are associated with greater and faster completion rates, with more positive market reactions, and with more dividend substitution than open market repurchases. Lastly, we find that preset repurchase plans represent a unique payout tool whose introduction encouraged a different set of firms to buy back stock and significantly altered the payout landscape. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, Editor-in-Chief.

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