Identi cation of Preferences in Network Formation Games

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aureo de Paula ◽  
Seth Richards-Shubik ◽  
Elie T. Tamer
Keyword(s):  
Network Formation ◽  
Network Formation Games

scholarly journals Network Formation Games Among Relay Stations in Next Generation Wireless Networks

2011 ◽  
Vol 59 (9) ◽  
pp. 2528-2542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walid Saad ◽  
Zhu Han ◽  
Tamer Basar ◽  
Merouane Debbah ◽  
Are Hjorungnes
Keyword(s):  
Wireless Networks ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Next Generation Wireless Networks ◽  
Network Formation Games ◽  
Relay Stations

A Structural Econometric Analysis of Network Formation Games Through Subnetworks

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 1829-1858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuyang Sheng
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Partial Identification ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Large Networks ◽  
Network Formation Games ◽  
Identification Approach ◽  
Structural Econometric ◽  
Simultaneous Move

The objective of this paper is to identify and estimate network formation models using observed data on network structure. We characterize network formation as a simultaneous‐move game, where the utility from forming a link depends on the structure of the network, thereby generating strategic interactions between links. With the prevalence of multiple equilibria, the parameters are not necessarily point identified. We leave the equilibrium selection unrestricted and propose a partial identification approach. We derive bounds on the probability of observing a subnetwork, where a subnetwork is the restriction of a network to a subset of the individuals. Unlike the standard bounds as in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), these subnetwork bounds are computationally tractable in large networks provided we consider small subnetworks. We provide Monte Carlo evidence that bounds from small subnetworks are informative in large networks.

Strategic Network Formation, Games on Networks, and Trust

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Raub ◽  
Vincenz Frey ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Simple Model ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Simultaneous Analysis ◽  
Major Research ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Network Formation Games ◽  
Strategic Rationality

AbstractThis paper brings two major research lines in current sociology together. Research on social networks has long focused primarily on network effects but meanwhile also addresses the emergence and dynamics of networks. Research on trust in social and economic relations shows that networks have effects on trust. Using game theory, we provide a simple model that allows for an integrated and simultaneous analysis of network effects on trust and for the endogenous emergence of the network. The model also allows for characterizing the value of the network. We use standard assumptions on full strategic rationality. Testable implications of the model as well as model extensions are sketched.

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