Does Hedge Fund 'Activism' Create Long Term Shareholder Value?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvan Allaire
Author(s):  
Simi Kedia ◽  
Laura Starks ◽  
Xianjue Wang

Abstract Hedge fund activists have ambiguous relationships with the institutional shareholders in their target firms. While some support their activities, others counter their actions. Due to their relatively small holdings in target firms, activists typically need the cooperation of other institutional shareholders that are willing to influence the activists’ campaign success. We find the presence of “activism-friendly” institutions as owners is associated with an increased probability of being a target, higher long-term stock returns, and higher operating performance. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting the composition of a firm’s ownership has significant effects on hedge fund activists’ decisions and outcomes.


Author(s):  
Lucian A. Bebchuk ◽  
Alon P. Brav ◽  
Wei Jiang

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucian Bebchuk ◽  
Alon Brav ◽  
Wei Jiang

2021 ◽  
pp. 380-390
Author(s):  
Roberto S. Santos ◽  
Sunny Li Sun

While the jury is out on whether hedge fund activism encourages corporate innovation, there is mounting evidence to suggest that this is the case. A firm’s ability to innovate is crucial for its long-term survival. Through multiple mechanisms, activist hedge fund interventions can “shake things up” and stir corporations out of their myopic innovation investments. By bringing an end to the squandering of precious R&D resources, hedge fund activism stimulates and reshapes corporate competitiveness and enhances innovation performance. This chapter explores the strategies and mechanisms that activist hedge funds employ to influence corporate innovation and also offers avenues for future research.


Author(s):  
Martijn Cremers ◽  
Erasmo Giambona ◽  
Simone M. Sepe ◽  
Ye Wang

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alon P. Brav ◽  
Wei Jiang ◽  
Hyunseob Kim

Author(s):  
David P. Stowell ◽  
Tim Moore ◽  
Jeff Schumacher

Are hedge funds heroes or villains? Management of Blockbuster, Time Warner, Six Flags, Knight-Ridder, and Bally Total Fitness might prefer the “villain” appellation, but Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and HealthSouth shareholders might view management as the real villains and hedge funds as vehicles to oust incompetent corporate managers before they run companies into the ground or steal them through fraudulent transactions. Could the pressure exerted by activist hedge funds on targeted companies result in increased share prices, management accountability, and better communication with shareholders? Or does it distract management from its primary goal of enhancing long-term shareholder value?To determine the benefits and disadvantages of activist hedge fund activity from the perspective of corporate management and shareholders; to examine if a hedge fund's suggested corporate restructuring could create greater shareholder value; and to explain the changing roles and perspectives of hedge funds.


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