scholarly journals The Ins and Outs of Mortgage Debt During the Housing Boom and Bust

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Bhutta
Keyword(s):  
Mortgage Debt ◽  
Housing Boom ◽  
Boom And Bust

scholarly journals The Vulnerability of Minority Homeowners in the Housing Boom and Bust

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bayer ◽  
Fernando Ferreira ◽  
Stephen L. Ross
Keyword(s):  
Racial Disparities ◽  
Economic Shocks ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Housing Boom ◽  
Boom And Bust ◽  
Credit Scores

This paper examines mortgage outcomes for a large sample of individual home purchases and refinances linked to credit scores in seven major US markets. Among those with similar credit scores and loan attributes, black and Hispanic homeowners had much higher rates of delinquency and default in the downturn. These estimated differences are especially pronounced for loans originated near the peak of the housing boom. These findings suggest that black and Hispanic homeowners drawn into the market near the peak were especially vulnerable to adverse economic shocks and raise concerns about homeownership as a mechanism for reducing racial disparities in wealth. (JEL D14, J15, R23, R31, R38)

The Housing Boom and Bust in the Twin Cities

2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Crump
Keyword(s):  
Twin Cities ◽  
Housing Boom ◽  
Boom And Bust

Effects of the Housing Boom and Bust on U.S. Metro Employment

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd M. Gabe ◽  
Richard Florida
Keyword(s):  
Housing Boom ◽  
Boom And Bust

Hiding high pay

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Guthrie
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Construction Industry ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Housing Boom ◽  
Boom And Bust ◽  
Home Construction ◽  
Bargaining Positions

This chapter uses pay in the home construction industry during the recent housing boom and bust to illustrate the second of the two competing theories that economists use to understand executive compensation: the managerial power hypothesis. According to this theory, boards at some firms have such weak bargaining positions that the only constraint on executive pay is the prospect of shareholder outrage. The theory’s central prediction is that weak boards and strong CEOs combine to find ways to pay executives that reduce the threat of shareholder outrage. This chapter develops this prediction and demonstrates its ability to explain observed pay practices that have the effect of camouflaging high pay levels.

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