Retail Traders and the Competitive Allocation of Attention

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun William Davies
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Allocation

scholarly journals A weapons–testes trade-off in males is amplified in female traits

2019 ◽  
Vol 286 (1908) ◽  
pp. 20190906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine W. Miller ◽  
Paul N. Joseph ◽  
Rebecca M. Kilner ◽  
Zachary Emberts
Keyword(s):  
Hind Limb ◽  
Reproductive Function ◽  
Developmental Timing ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Hind Limbs ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Competitive Allocation ◽  
Experimental Comparisons ◽  
Functional Grouping

Sexually selected weapons are assumed to trade off with traits related to ejaculates, such as testes. However, remarkably little is known about what governs resource allocation and why trade-offs are found in some cases and not others. Often-used models depict competitive allocation occurring within the functional grouping of traits (e.g. reproduction); however, other factors including tissue expense and developmental timing may influence allocation. Experimental comparisons of investment across the sexes have the potential to illuminate allocation rules, because the sexes do not always use traits for the same functions. Here, we capitalize upon a species where females have weapons–testes homologues. We report that a documented trade-off in investment between hind-limb weapons and testes in leaf-footed cactus bugs, Narnia femorata , is even more pronounced in female hind limbs and ovaries. Female hind limbs in this species do not share the clear reproductive function of male hind limbs; therefore, this trade-off spans trait functional groups. Such patterns of investment suggest that future studies of reproductive trade-offs should consider factors such as tissue expense and developmental timing.

Architectural research and its enemies

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Macmillan
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Architectural Education ◽  
Research Assessment ◽  
Research Assessment Exercise ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Research Excellence Framework ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Architectural Research ◽  
Competitive Allocation ◽  
Support Research

Like the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) that preceded it, the UK government's proposed Research Excellence Framework (REF) is a means of allocating funding in higher education to support research. As with any method for the competitive allocation of funds it creates winners and losers and inevitably generates a lot of emotion among those rewarded or penalised. More specifically, the ‘winners’ tend to approve of the method of allocation and the ‘losers’ denigrate it as biased against their activities and generally unfair. An extraordinary press campaign has been consistently waged against research assessment and its methods by those involved in architectural education, which I will track over a decade and a half. What follows will question whether this campaign demonstrates the sophistication and superior judgment of those who have gone into print, or conversely whether its mixture of misinformation and disinformation reveals not just disenchantment and prejudice, but a naivety and a depth of ignorance about the fundamentals of research that is deeply damaging to the credibility of architecture as a research-based discipline. With the recent consultation process towards a new cycle of research assessment, the REF, getting under way, I aim to draw attention to the risk of repeating past mistakes.

A Dynamic Price-Setting Mechanism for a Hybrid Matching Market

2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 295
Author(s):  
Marilda Sotomayor
Keyword(s):  
International Markets ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Dynamic Allocation ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Price Equilibrium ◽  
The Core ◽  
Dynamic Price ◽  
National Market ◽  
Setting Mechanism ◽  
Competitive Allocation

After observing the problem of the intimate wear market of Nova Friburgo with the distribution of its product both in Brazil and abroad, we designed a dynamic allocation mechanism that sets the prices according to the demand from the buyers, based on their preferences, and that yields an allocation for the core of the market game in a finite number of steps. With this scheme, all agents are simultaneously present and all sellers sell to both national and international markets. We prove that the core allocation produced by this mechanism provides the lowest price among all outcomes for the core that maintains the same allocations of objects for international buyers as the final allocation. In addition, it coincides with the competitive allocation of minimum price equilibrium, when restricted to the national market, and with the allocation produced by the GaleShapley algorithm (1962), in which buyers make proposals and where there is a convenient tie-breaking rule, when all buyers are from abroad.

scholarly journals Perceived Loudness Sensitivity Influenced by Brightness in Urban Forests: A Comparison When Eyes Were Opened and Closed

Forests ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 1242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin-Chen Hong ◽  
Guang-Yu Wang ◽  
Jiang Liu ◽  
Emily Dang
Keyword(s):  
Urban Forests ◽  
Diurnal Variations ◽  
Cognitive Resources ◽  
Positive Health ◽  
Individual Perception ◽  
Health Related ◽  
Forested Areas ◽  
Eye Opening ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Competitive Allocation

Soundscape plays a positive, health-related role in urban forests, and there is a competitive allocation of cognitive resources between soundscapes and lightscapes. This study aimed to explore the relationship between perceived loudness sensitivity and brightness in urban forests through eye opening and closure. Questionnaires and measuring equipment were used to gather soundscape and lightscape information at 44 observation sites in urban forested areas. Diurnal variations, Pearson’s correlations, and formula derivations were then used to analyze the relationship between perception sensitivity and how perceived loudness sensitivity was influenced by lightscape. Our results suggested that soundscape variation plays a role in audio–visual perception in urban forests. Our findings also showed a gap in perception sensitivity between loudness and brightness, which conducted two opposite conditions bounded by 1.24 dBA. Furthermore, we found that the effect of brightness on perceived loudness sensitivity was limited if variations of brightness were sequential and weak. This can facilitate the understanding of individual perception to soundscape and lightscape in urban forests when proposing suitable design plans.

Moral Pluralism and Philanthropy

1987 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-112
Author(s):  
David Sidorsky
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Religious Vision ◽  
Bird Watching ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Competitive Allocation

The idea of moral pluralism generates a dilemma for the practice of philanthropy. Characteristically, the practice of philanthropy assumes unity, coherence, or convergence among the diverse virtues and moral aims that it pursues. In the philanthropic tradition, it is recognized that the goals of a particular philanthropy will vary. Yet, if these are sincere expressions of the philanthropic will, each represents some portion of the manifold activity of “doing good” according to particularized choice or style. The relevant analogy should be drawn to the slogan of “giving to the college of your choice” or to worship of the one god in your own way, where the plurality of expression is not only consistent with the residual value of education or of religion, but articulates the pragmatic way to realize the underlying values of a pluralistic society.Historically, this reflects the place of a unifying religious vision of the nature of the good or of a secular conception of a public philosophy which recognized the common good. Even etymologically, the love of mankind suggests a single passion that is directed beneficently to the shared values of mankind.The theory and practice of contemporary philanthropy is necessarily pluralistic, however, and it reflects the range of decisions by individuals with different interests and values in a pluralist, democratic society. The legitimized and recognized range of philanthropies in modern societies demonstrates divergent and even conflicting perceptions of the common good or the public interest.Thus, the range of philanthropies includes support for bird watching and for business opportunities of minorities, which may require some decisions on “comparable worth” and competitive allocation of resources.

Trade and growth in a model of allocative inefficiency

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Cothren ◽  
Ravi Radhakrishnan
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Productivity Growth ◽  
Reverse Causation ◽  
Resource Misallocation ◽  
Competitive Allocation ◽  
Trade And Growth ◽  
Allocative Inefficiency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Volume Of Trade

AbstractThe empirical evidence on the causal relationship between international trade and economic growth is inconclusive. While some studies show that trade leads to growth, others have pointed to a reverse causation. In this paper, we develop a model of international trade and productivity growth in the presence of a misallocation of resources. Misallocation in a country arises as a result of lobbying by firms to establish barriers to the competitive allocation of labor. Misallocation prevents the country from exploiting its technological comparative advantage and leads to a reduction in the volume of trade in the absence of any explicit trade barriers. In the model, whether barriers diminish or worsen with productivity growth depends on the extent of the initial resource misallocation. If the initial resource misallocation is not severe, then productivity growth leads to diminishing barriers and vice versa. In either case, productivity growth strengthens the comparative advantage over time and therefore increases the volume of trade.

scholarly journals Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Attar ◽  
Catherine Casamatta ◽  
Arnold Chassagnon ◽  
Jean-Paul Décamps
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Financial Contracts ◽  
Strategic Default ◽  
Investment Capacity ◽  
Competitive Allocation

We study capital markets in which investors compete by designing financial contracts to control an entrepreneur’s ability to side trade and default on multiple loans. We show that covenants may have anticompetitive effects: in particular, they prevent investors from providing additional funds and reduce the entrepreneur’s investment capacity. As a result, a large number of inefficient allocations is supported at equilibrium. We propose a subsidy mechanism similar to guarantee funds in financial markets that efficiently controls the entrepreneur’s side trading and sustains the competitive allocation as the unique equilibrium one. (JEL D21, D82, D86, G21, G32)

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