scholarly journals Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan J. Newton ◽  
Julie Persellin ◽  
Dechun Wang ◽  
Michael S. Wilkins
2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 603-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan J. Newton ◽  
Julie S. Persellin ◽  
Dechun Wang ◽  
Michael S. Wilkins

ABSTRACT This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit market competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit market competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit market competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit quality and audit market competition.


2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-215
Author(s):  
Hyun Jae Park ◽  
Jaewan Park ◽  
Hye Jeong Nam

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hojat Mohammadi ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Meysam Arabzadeh ◽  
Hassan Ghodrati

Purpose This paper aims to assess auditor narcissism’s effect on audit market competition (auditor concentration, clients’ concentration and competitive pressure). Design/methodology/approach This paper’s method is descriptive-correlational based on published information from listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2018 using a sample of 188 firms (1,310 observations). The method used for hypothesis testing is linear regression using panel data. Findings The results show a negative and significant relationship between auditor narcissism and audit market competition and its indices, including auditor concentration, clients’ concentration and competitive pressure. Moreover, a positive and significant relationship was observed between audit quality and audit market competition and its indices, including auditor concentration, client concentration and competitive pressure. Originality/value To analyzes competition indices in the audit market (auditor concentration, clients’ concentration and competitive pressure). The variable is assessed once more using the exploratory factor analysis of the so-called three variables single variable, named audit market competition. So the central question of the study is investigated within a broader sense. Moreover, as the present study is carried out in the emergent financial markets with extremely competitive audit markets to figure out the effect of auditors’ intrinsic characteristics on such markets’ competitiveness, it can provide useful information in this field.


1998 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
VIVIEN BEATTIE ◽  
STELLA FEARNLEY

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Moser

This paper investigates the impact of increased audit market competition on audit quality and auditor choice. I develop a model comprising two auditors who compete for a new client by choosing the audit quality for their respective existing clients and using the audited report as a signal. I identify factors that influence auditor quality decisions as well as the behavior of clients, who potentially misstate their reports. Auditors are tempted to alter audit quality because they are eager to appear desirable from a new client's perspective. Interestingly, while recipients of the audited report adjust their conjectures about audit quality, there are conditions under which auditors lower their audit quality to increase the likelihood of being hired. The analysis extends the existing literature by describing a new approach to modeling the auditors' motivation to signal reputation for certain behavior.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Hansen ◽  
Ling Lei Lisic ◽  
Timothy A. Seidel ◽  
Michael S. Wilkins

Our study is motivated by the theory of credence goods in the auditing setting. We propose that audit committee accounting expertise should reduce information asymmetries between the auditor and the client, thereby limiting auditors' ability to over-audit and under-audit. Consistent with this notion, our results indicate that when audit committees have accounting expertise, clients (1) pay lower fees when changes in standards decrease required audit effort; (2) pay a smaller fee premium in the presence of remediated material weaknesses; and (3) have a reduced likelihood of restatement when audit market competition is high. Our findings in the under-auditing setting generally are strongest among non-Big 4 engagements, consistent with non-Big 4 auditors being less sensitive to market-wide disciplining mechanisms such as reputation, legal liability, and professional regulation. We also provide evidence that the nature of audit committee members' accounting expertise differentially impacts the committee's ability to curtail over- and under-auditing.


Author(s):  
T. Zhukova ◽  
I. Hanus ◽  
I. Plikus

The analysis of the audit services market clearly demonstrates a significant fluctuation in the quantity and cost of services in different regions, which in most cases depends on the concentration of industrial enterprises, the solvency of the audit customers themselves and their understanding of the cost and quality of audit services. This article is dedicated to this, in which such fundamental issues of the activities of audit firms and auditors as entering the professional services market, the quality of such services, and pricing for audit services are examined. The analysis of the audit services market clearly demonstrates a significant fluctuation in the quantity and cost of services in different regions, which in most cases depends on the concentration of industrial enterprises, the solvency of the audit customers themselves and their understanding the cost and quality of audit services. The article considers such problems of the auditors and audit firms activities as entering the professional services market, the quality of such services, and pricing of audit services. The analysis of the market of audit services is presented, which demonstrates a significant fluctuation in the quantity and cost of services in different regions, which in most cases depends on the solvency of audit customers, the concentration of industrial enterprises and the quality of audit services provided. The analysis of the audit activities results and the state of the market for audit services indicates that the audit market suffers from changes occurring in the country, which indicate that the audit market is functioning and transforming as a result of a number of factors, in particular: crisis phenomena in society; stricter requirements for the audit profession by regulators; imperfection of the legislative framework; lack of a mechanism for pricing audit services; lack of punishment for false information in the reports of auditors; insufficient number of highly qualified auditors; decrease in solvency of audit customersю It was found that, along with a decrease in the number of subjects of audit activity in the Register of Audit Firms, there is a tendency to increase the volume of services provided. It is proved that in order to increase the value of the audit, introduce and operate a system for ensuring the quality of audit services, improve the professional knowledge of practicing accountants, increase the market for audit services and ensure the important role of the audit profession recognized in our society, constant monitoring and development of decisions on issues related to the functioning of the audit system in Ukraine are necessary. Keywords: audit, market, competition, audit quality, cost of audit services, subjects of audit activity


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