Compensated Lindahl Equilibrium: Efficiency Theorems and Gains from Trade with Individual Production and Public Goods

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis C. Corchhn ◽  
Peter J. Hammond ◽  
Jaume Sempere
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Gains From Trade ◽  
Lindahl Equilibrium

Mood and cooperation in a public goods dilemma

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Parks ◽  
Blythe Duell ◽  
Larry Sanna
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods

public goods

2008 ◽  
pp. 739-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnar Sandmo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods

On the Essence and Tipology of International Public Goods

2005 ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
V. Mortikov
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Social Construction ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Basic Properties ◽  
International Public Goods ◽  
Regional Public Goods ◽  
Joint Products

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.

The incumbent, challenger, and population during revolution and civil war

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Hausken ◽  
Mthuli Ncube
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
The Other ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Geographic Regions

We consider revolutions and civil war involving an incumbent, a challenger, and the population. Revolutions are classified into eight outcomes. In four outcomes incumbent repression occurs (viewed as providing sub-threshold benefits such as public goods to the population). Accommodation occurs in the other four outcomes (benefits provision above a threshold). The incumbent and challenger fight each other. The incumbent may win and retain power or else lose, thereby causing standoff or coalition. In a standoff, which is costly, no one backs down and uncertainty exists about who is in power. In a coalition, which is less costly, the incumbent and challenger cooperate, compromise, and negotiate their differences. If the population successfully revolts against the incumbent, the challenger replaces the incumbent. Eighty-seven revolutions during 1961–2011, including the recent Arab spring revolutions, are classified into the eight outcomes. When repressive, the incumbent loses 46 revolutions, remains in power through 21 revolutions, and builds a coalition after 12 revolutions. When accommodative, the incumbent loses seven revolutions and builds a coalition after one revolution. The 87 revolutions are classified across geographic regions and by time-period.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document