scholarly journals An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Risk Aversion in Executive Compensation Contracts

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Moers ◽  
Erik Peek
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Compensation Contracts

The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 1139-1163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takuya Iwasaki ◽  
Shota Otomasa ◽  
Atsushi Shiiba ◽  
Akinobu Shuto
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Compensation Contracts

scholarly journals Stock Repurchases and Executive Compensation Contract Design: The Role of Earnings per Share Performance Conditions

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 703-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Young ◽  
Jing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Stock Repurchases ◽  
Stock Repurchase ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Earnings Per Share ◽  
Contingent Compensation ◽  
Strong Positive Association ◽  
Performance Conditions

ABSTRACT: We examine the link between firms’ stock repurchase activity and the presence of earnings per share (EPS) performance conditions in executive compensation contracts. Findings reveal a strong positive association between repurchases and EPS-contingent compensation arrangements. Further analysis suggests net benefits to shareholders from this association. Specifically, repurchasers experience larger increases in total payouts; the positive association between repurchases and cash performance is more pronounced for firms with EPS targets in the presence of surplus cash; undervalued firms with EPS targets are more likely to signal mispricing through a repurchase; and repurchasers with EPS conditions are associated with lower abnormal accruals. We find no evidence that EPS-driven repurchases impose costs on shareholders in the form of investment myopia.

Empirical Analysis of Clinical Evaluations on Children Involved in the Child Protection System: The Role of Age and Gender

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erika Felix ◽  
Anjali T. Naik-Polan ◽  
Christine Sloss ◽  
Lashaunda Poindexter ◽  
Karen S. Budd
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Child Protection ◽  
Protection System ◽  
Age And Gender ◽  
Clinical Evaluations ◽  
And Gender

Selecting which touchpoints to manage for customer loyalty: an empirical analysis in retail banking

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Marco Ieva ◽  
Cristina Ziliani
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Customer Loyalty ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Customer Experience ◽  
Retail Banking ◽  
Customer Experience Management ◽  
Moderating Role

Customer Experience develops through a journey of touchpoints. However, little is known on the role of touchpoints in contributing to customer loyalty, which is the final aim of Customer Experience Management. This study provides an examination of the relative and moderating role of frequency and positivity of exposure to more than twenty touchpoints and their interplay in contributing to customer loyalty. An online survey on more than three thousand consumers is run with reference to retail banking. Results show that only a small number of touchpoints is significantly related to customer loyalty. Findings point companies' attention to invest their efforts in managing both the frequency and positivity of specific touchpoints.

scholarly journals Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199716
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim ◽  
Jun Koga Sudduth
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
The Creation

Does the creation of nominally democratic institutions help dictators stay in power by diminishing the risk of coups? We posit that the effectiveness of political institutions in deterring coups crucially depends on the types of plotters and their political goals. By providing a means to address the ruling coalition’s primary concerns about a dictator’s opportunism or incompetence, institutions reduce the necessity of reshuffling coups, in which the ruling coalition replaces an incumbent leader but keeps the regime intact. However, such institutions do not diminish the risk of regime-changing coups, because the plotters’ goals of overthrowing the entire regime and changing the group of ruling coalition are not achievable via activities within the institutions. Our empirical analysis provides strong empirical support for our expectations. Our findings highlight that the role of “democratic” institutions in deterring coups is rather limited as it only applies to less than 38% of coup attempts.

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