scholarly journals Can They Beat the Cournot Equilibrium? Learning with Memory and Convergence to Equilibria in a Cournot Oligopoly

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Vallle ◽  
Murat Yildizoglu
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Convergence To Equilibria ◽  
With Memory

Analysis on Cournot Oligopoly Game Models With Two Firms and More Than Two Firms

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Cournot Game ◽  
Existence Conditions ◽  
Equilibrium Theorem

This paper reviews the standard game models and its Nash equilibrium and then analyses Cournot oligopoly game from two firms to the case with more than two firms. Due to Cournot equilibrium point, the concept of Cournot equilibrium point is the same as the concept as the non-cooperative game with pure strategy but the strategy can be chosen in Cournot game is infinity and it can not be obtained base on Nash equilibrium theorem. Finally, the existence conditions of Cournot equilibrium point are given and the theorem and its proof of the existence Cournot equilibrium point are given too.

scholarly journals Local Stability of Cournot Equilibrium as the Number of Firms Increases

2021 ◽  
pp. 972-980
Author(s):  
Adyda Ibrahim ◽  
Nerda Zura Zaibidi ◽  
Azizan Saaban
Keyword(s):  
Local Stability ◽  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Demand Function ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Adaptive Expectations ◽  
The Third ◽  
Decision Mechanisms ◽  
Isoelastic Demand Function ◽  
Number Of Firms

In this paper, a Cournot oligopoly with isoelastic demand function and constant marginal cost is considered. The local stability conditions of the Cournot equilibrium are determined for four models with different decision mechanisms. In the first model, firms adjust their outputs using the best reply response with naive expectations. The second model is a generalization of the first one, where firms have adaptive expectations. Meanwhile, the third and fourth models adopt the bounded rationality and local monopolistic approximation, respectively. The results show that, in the case of identical firms, the Cournot equilibrium is always stable when the firms adopt the local monopolistic approximation mechanism.

Capito-Lunate Fusion with Memory Staples

2015 ◽  
Vol 04 (S 01) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Solomons
Keyword(s):  
With Memory
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