scholarly journals The Effects of Competition Policy: Merger Approval, Entry Barrier Removal, Antitrust Enforcement Compared

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svetlana Avdasheva ◽  
Dina Tsytsulina
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Entry Barrier ◽  
Barrier Removal

Some Key Issues Concerning Further Development of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wang Xianlin
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Judicial Process ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
Strict Compliance ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Further Development

Since the Anti-Monopoly Law was enforced in China more than eight years ago, important achievements have occurred, as well as challenges for further development. In addition to challenges relating to amending legislation, strengthening enforcement, improving the judicial process, and ensuring strict compliance, etc, there are four issues that will be focused on here, namely: taking monopoly industries as a breakthrough to further promote the enforcement of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (both administrative and civil antitrust enforcement should focus on prominent monopolistic conducts in typical monopoly industries); properly handling the coordination between industrial policy and competition policy; promoting the cooperation between the Anti-Monopoly Law and intellectual property law; and cultivating China’s competition culture.

Theory in closer contact with industrial life: American institutional economists on competition theory and policy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Matthew T. Panhans ◽  
Reinhard Schumacher
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Mainstream Economic ◽  
Competition Theory ◽  
One Stage ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Experimental Attitude

Abstract This paper investigates the views on competition theory and policy of the American institutional economists during the first half of the 20th century. These perspectives contrasted with those of contemporary neoclassical and later mainstream economic approaches. We identify three distinct dimensions to an institutionalist perspective on competition. First, institutionalist approaches focused on describing industry details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with reality. Second, institutionalists emphasized that while competition was sometimes beneficial, it could also be disruptive. Third, institutionalists had a broad view of the objectives of competition policy that extended beyond effects on consumer welfare. Consequently, institutionalists advocated for a wide range of policies to enhance competition, including industrial self-regulation, broad stakeholder representation within corporations, and direct governmental regulations. Their experimental attitude implied that policy would always be evolving, and antitrust enforcement might be only one stage in the development toward a regime of industrial regulation.

6. Competition Policy Defending the Economic Constitution

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Wilks
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Economic Constitution ◽  
Directorate General ◽  
The Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

This chapter examines the European Union’s competition policy and how its effectiveness has steadily increased in terms of controlling restrictive practices, abuse of dominant position, mergers, state aid, and the liberalization of utilities. It considers how the central dominance of the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) in the European Commission has been perpetuated and how competition policy has become a supranational policy competence which can be regarded as an ‘economic constitution’ for Europe. The chapter also discusses the decentralization of antitrust enforcement to the national agencies and courts through the ‘Modernization Regulation’ of 2003, as well as a ‘turn to economics’ in which economic analysis has been substituted for legal tests to move towards an ‘effects-based’ (effect on competition) interpretation of the law.

scholarly journals When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICE BOUGETTE ◽  
MARC DESCHAMPS ◽  
FRÉDÉRIC MARTY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Minor Influence

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.

scholarly journals Competition Policy And Organizational Fragmentation In Health Care

2009 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas (Tim) Greaney
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Health Policy ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Delivery System ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Good Time ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Fee For Service ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Payment Systems

Once upon a time . . . and a very good time it was, advocates for marketbased approaches to health policy had a coherent story to tell. Cost and quality would remain suboptimal as long as fee-for-service medicine persisted and the myriad market imperfections that impede efficiency went unchecked. However, things could be righted by adopting principles associated with managed care, together with pursuing sensible antitrust enforcement and government deregulation to clear away the private and regulatory underbrush obstructing market forces. Economic theorists and policy experts agreed that these steps would effectively address information, agency, and moral hazard problems and begin to glue together the pieces of our fragmented delivery system. And, for a while, things seemed to work out as promised. Providers began to reorganize into firms and other integrating arrangements and health insurers adopted financial and contractual measures designed to align provider incentives with consumer needs. Regulators directed policies at removing obstacles to competition and antitrust enforcers sought to encourage efficient consolidation while blocking cartels and provider oligopolies. Spiraling costs leveled off for a while and both payment systems and provider organizations began to adapt to market forces.

Culture, Economics, and Antitrust

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-103
Author(s):  
Albert Allen Foer
Keyword(s):  
Economic Activity ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Cultural Dimensions ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Cultural Aspects ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Neoclassical Economic Theory ◽  
Global Harmonization ◽  
Multidisciplinary Perspective

What role do cultural dimensions of cooperation and competition play in economic life? Taking a multidisciplinary perspective, this essay uses the example of the concept of trust to consider some implications for competition policy. The author suggests that the field of competition policy is at core about the authoritative allocation of categories of economic activity along a spectrum with individualism and competition at one end and collectivism and cooperation at the other. The allocation is a function of the state, made on the basis of a variety of imprecise inputs—cultural, political, historic, economic, and institutional—and not merely neoclassical economic theory. Sensitivity to the cultural aspects of competition and cooperation places constraints on overly optimistic expectations for global harmonization of antitrust enforcement.

Antitrust After Big Data

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
John M. Yun
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Innovation Process ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
Data Practices ◽  
Barrier To Entry ◽  
Level Of Experience

With the rise of digital markets, the conventional wisdom was that big data was a new economic phenomenon that would allow incumbent firms with market power to entrench their market positions, foreclose competitors, and serve as a virtually insurmountable barrier to entry. This led to calls for greater antitrust enforcement and regulation of big data practices. Since that time, with the benefit of substantial growth in the theoretical and empirical economic literature involving big data, it is appropriate to revisit our understanding of big data’s implications for antitrust. This paper contributes to the discussion by detailing three things we have learned about big data as it applies to competition policy. First, we now have a better understanding of the role that big data plays in the production and innovation process. Second, it makes little sense to reflexively label big data as a barrier to entry. Competition policy is better served by considering actual entry conditions rather than basing competitive effects analysis on determining whether access to certain inputs are or are not barriers to entry. Third, competition authorities now have a sizeable level of experience in assessing big data in actual cases. It is notable that, thus far, big data alone has not fuelled a theory of harm that has led to an agency challenge in the U.S.A. or Europe. All these considerations suggest that we are perhaps in a new, more mature, era regarding big data in competition policy – not because big data is any less important to innovation – but because researchers and regulators have consistently found that big data in and of itself does not represent a relevant antitrust concern.

scholarly journals Defining hospital markets for antitrust enforcement: new approaches and their applicability to The Netherlands

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCO VARKEVISSER ◽  
CORY S. CAPPS ◽  
FREDERIK T. SCHUT
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Crucial Importance ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Dutch Hospital ◽  
Hospital Market ◽  
Hospital Markets ◽  
New Approaches

AbstractEffective antitrust enforcement is of crucial importance for countries with a market-based health care system in which hospitals are expected to compete. Assessing hospital market power – a central issue to competition policy – is, however, complicated because the presence of third party payers and the general unobservability of prices make it difficult to apply the standard methods of market definition. Alternative, less formal methods historically employed in the hospital industry have proven inaccurate; these methods were even called inapplicable in a recent US court decision. In this paper, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of several new approaches to defining hospital markets that are suggested in the recent economic literature. In particular, we discuss the applicability of the time-elasticity approach, competitor-share approach, and option-demand approach to the recently partly deregulated Dutch hospital market. We conclude that the appropriate approach depends crucially on how health insurers contract with hospitals and how patients select their hospital.

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