New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
David K. Millon
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Law ◽  
Production Model ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Game Plan ◽  
Business As Usual

Co-Production, Polycentricity, and Value Heterogeneity: The Ostroms’ Public Choice Institutionalism Revisited

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 726-741 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL DRAGOS ALIGICA ◽  
VLAD TARKO
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Production Model ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Theoretical Assumption ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Theory Of Value

Revisiting the theory of institutional hybridity and diversity developed by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom to cope with the challenge of the “neither states nor markets” institutional domain, this article reconstructs the Ostromian system along the “value heterogeneity–co-production–polycentricity” axis. It articulates the elements of a theory of value heterogeneity and of the fuzzy boundaries between private and public. It rebuilds the model of co-production, clarifying the ambiguity surrounding a key technical public choice theoretical assumption, and it demonstrates (a) why it should not be confused with the Alchian-Demsetz team production model and (b) how co-production engenders a type of market failure that has been neglected so far. In light of this analysis, the article reconsiders polycentricity, the capstone of the Ostromian system, explaining why polycentricity may be seen as a solution both to this co-production market failure problem and to the problems of social choice in conditions of deep heterogeneity. It also discusses further normative corollaries.

From Hired Hands to Co-Owners: Compensation, Team Production, and the Role of the CEO

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Boatright
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Production Model ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Current Financial Crisis ◽  
And Control ◽  
Standard Agent

ABSTRACT:In the 1990s, the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) of major United States corporations underwent a profound transformation in which CEOs went from being bureaucrats or technocrats to shareholder partisans who acted more like proprietors or entrepreneurs. This transformation occurred in response to changes in the competitive environment of U.S. corporations and also to the agency theory argument that high levels of compensation by means of stock options helped to overcome the agency problem inherent in the separation of ownership and control. Some critics charge that this new CEO role is objectionable for a variety of reasons, which may also be applicable to the current financial crisis in which CEO misconduct may have played a part. These objections are based largely on a team production model of corporate governance, which is held by these critics to be superior to the standard agent-principal model. This article examines the objections offered by critics of the changed role of the CEO and argues that their negative assessment of this development and their use of the team production model to support their conclusions are not warranted. CEOs have changed from hired hands to co-owners, and this change may have contributed in some measure to the current financial crisis. However, in determining the morally preferable role of the CEO, care must be taken not to discard what is sound in the changed role.

scholarly journals A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law

2017 ◽  
pp. 169-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret M. Blair ◽  
Lynn A. Stout
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Law ◽  
Production Theory ◽  
Team Production

scholarly journals A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law

2015 ◽  
pp. 299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Ben-Ishai
Keyword(s):  
Power Relations ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Stakeholder Group ◽  
Production Theory ◽  
Direct Control ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Shareholder Primacy ◽  
Share Ownership ◽  
Public Corporations

The article applies the Team Production Theorydeveloped by American corporate law scholars, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, to argue that Canadian corporate law's understanding of public corporations that are not controlled by a single shareholder or group of shareholders reflects a director primacy norm rather than a shareholder primacy norm. Canadian corporate law provides that directors of such public corporations with widely-held share ownership and voting rights are free from direct control by any corporate stakeholders. A potential departing point for Canadian corporate law. the oppression remedy, continues to develop to deal with extra-legal advantages rooted primarily in unequal power relations among corporate stakeholders.  However, in its current and predicted future applications, the oppression remedy does not provide any given stakeholder group with an ability to dominate the boards of public corporations and obviate the director primacy norm. The article suggests that because the director primacy norm accurately describes Canadian corporate law, further consideration needs to be given to corporate law's relative relevance in dictating how Canadian corporations currently operate.

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