scholarly journals Pay-for-(Persistent)-Luck: CEO Bonuses Under Relational and Formal Contracting

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jed DeVaro ◽  
Jin-Hyuk Kim ◽  
Nick Vikander
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Bonuses

scholarly journals IMPACT OF GREEN MANAGEMENT ON CEO COMPENSATION: INTERPLAY OF THE AGENCY THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVES

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Banu Goktan
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
Natural Environments ◽  
Green Management ◽  
Ceo Bonuses

There has been growing interest in green management practices among practitioners, researchers and regulators in recent years. However, there is limited research that examines the connection between natural environments and human resource management practices. The current study examined the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and green management practices within the agency theory and institutional theory frameworks. Results revealed a significant negative relationship between green management practices and CEO base pay, however, there was not a significant relationship between green management practices and CEO bonuses. In line with previous agency theory research, findings suggest a negative relationship between state regulation and CEO compensation in green states. An important implication for practice is that the negative relationship may strengthen negative perceptions about green management practices among CEOs and reduce willingness to implement green management practices.

The impact of customer satisfaction on CEO bonuses

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 828-845 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent O’Connell ◽  
Don O’Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Customer Satisfaction ◽  
Ceo Bonuses ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Effective bonus?

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-220
Author(s):  
Gloria Y. Tian ◽  
Fan Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Ceo Bonuses

Is it economically meaningful and ethical for firms to pay their CEOs cash bonuses in thousands, if not millions, of dollars? This paper empirically addresses two aspects of this issue. First, we document that a bonus is only statistically, but not economically, sensitive to short‐term firm performance and shareholder value creation. In addition, a discretionary bonus, on average representing 12% of a CEO’s annual compensation, adds little value to shareholders. Second, we find that firms with increased CEO bonuses have a higher likelihood of engaging in takeover activities, although such takeovers do not necessarily result in greater firm risk.

scholarly journals CEO Bonuses as Studied by Robust Logistic Regression

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-310
Author(s):  
Richard P. Hauser ◽  
David Booth
Keyword(s):  
Logistic Regression ◽  
Ceo Bonuses

Will Disclosure of Friendship Ties between Directors and CEOs Yield Perverse Effects?

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 1545-1563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob M. Rose ◽  
Anna M. Rose ◽  
Carolyn Strand Norman ◽  
Cheri R. Mazza
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Public Disclosure ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Ceo Bonuses

ABSTRACT: Our paper examines three related questions: Will directors who have friendship ties with the CEO manage earnings to benefit the CEO in the short term while potentially sacrificing the welfare of the company in the long term? Will public disclosure of friendship ties mitigate or exacerbate such behavior, and will disclosure of friendship ties influence investors' perceptions of director decisions? We conduct an experiment involving 56 active and experienced corporate directors from U.S. firms and a second experiment with M.B.A. students. We find that friendship ties caused directors to be more willing to approve reductions to research and development (R&D) expenses that cause earnings to rise enough to meet the CEO's minimum bonus target more often than when the directors and CEO were not friends. However, disclosing friendship ties resulted in even greater reductions in R&D expenses and higher CEO bonuses than not disclosing friendship ties. In a second experiment, we find that shareholders were more likely to agree with directors' decisions to approve cuts to R&D when friendship ties were disclosed. These findings have potentially important implications for corporate governance because they suggest that friendship ties between the CEO and board members can impair the directors' independence and objectivity, and that disclosure of the relationships can worsen this effect.

Determints of CEO Bonus Compensation

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-34
Author(s):  
Hwei Cheng Wang ◽  
Chih Chi Fang ◽  
Yung-I Lou ◽  
Randall Zhaohui Xu
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
International Diversification ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Accounting Earnings ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Investment Opportunities ◽  
Industry Diversification ◽  
Ceo Bonuses ◽  
Ceo Bonus

Abstract The primary purpose of this study is to explore the determinants of CEO bonus compensation: to examine CEO bonuses and to explore whether or not the independent variables are associated with CEO bonus compensation. For the purposes of this study, a sample of 2,448 CEO bonus compensations across 1,622 firms from 1997 to 2002 was used to test several hypotheses. The dependent variable in this model is the CEO bonus compensation. Bonus is the dollar value of the bonus (cash and non-cash) earned by the named executive officer during the fiscal year. Corporate diversification was divided into two categories; international diversification and industry diversification. Firm performance is measured by both Market-based, Performance (RET) and Accounting-based, Performance (ACE). The results show that the higher the degree of international diversification, and the higher accounting earnings performance, the more CEOs receive in bonuses. In addition, this study found that international diversification is associated with a greater use of bonuses and with a greater reliance on accounting-based, rather than market-based measures of firm performance. The results also demonstrated that CEOs in firms with more investment opportunities will receive higher bonuses than CEOs in firms with fewer investment opportunities and CEOs in larger firms will receive higher bonuses than CEOs in smaller firms.

The effect of independent directors' financial expertise on the use of private information in setting bank CEO bonuses

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guoping Liu ◽  
Jerry Sun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Ceo Bonuses

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine whether independent directors' financial expertise affects the use of private information in setting bank chief executive officer (CEO) bonuses.Design/methodology/approachThe association between future firm performance and bank CEO bonuses is used to measure the incorporation of private information into bonuses. Both level and change specifications are employed to test the effect of independent directors' financial expertise on the use of private information in setting CEO bonuses.FindingsIt is found that future firm performance is more positively associated with bank CEO bonuses for banks with a higher proportion of financial experts among independent directors than for other banks. The findings suggest that independent directors with financial expertise can more effectively use private information in setting bank CEO bonuses.Originality/valueResearch on independent directors' role in the use of private information in setting compensation is valuable for understanding how corporate governance can enhance the efficiency of CEO compensation contracts. This study indicates that financial experts on the bank board play an important role in this regard.

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