scholarly journals From Interpersonal to Interorganizational Trust: The Role of Indirect Reciprocity

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Vanneste
2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 (1) ◽  
pp. 11652
Author(s):  
Mohamed Hedi Charki ◽  
Emmanuel Josserand ◽  
Nabila Boukef Charki

Author(s):  
Ulrika H. Westergren

This chapter is an attempt to build on and extend existing outsourcing research by focusing on the process of managing an outsourcing partnership. Furthermore, it considers the role of information technology and the importance of establishing interorganizational trust in order to provide a deeper understanding of the partnership outsourcing phenomenon. The outsourcing partnership in focus in this chapter is between Alpha Corp., a large minerals group, and RDC, its remote service provider. The chapter shows that Alpha Corp.’s strategy for creating, maintaining and evolving the partnership with RDC occurs in three different stages: black-boxing of technology, establishing interorganizational trust, and performance based contracting. Given the multiple roles information technology assumes in an outsourcing alliance, this chapter also shows that understanding and managing the role of IT is crucial in maintaining a successful partnership. In addition, given the documented importance of information technology in outsourcing partnerships, there is a need to include trust in technology as yet another dimension in establishing interorganizational trust.


2008 ◽  
Vol 364 (1518) ◽  
pp. 791-806 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Gächter ◽  
Benedikt Herrmann

Understanding the proximate and ultimate sources of human cooperation is a fundamental issue in all behavioural sciences. In this paper, we review the experimental evidence on how people solve cooperation problems. Existing studies show without doubt that direct and indirect reciprocity are important determinants of successful cooperation. We also discuss the insights from a large literature on the role of peer punishment in sustaining cooperation. The experiments demonstrate that many people are ‘strong reciprocators’ who are willing to cooperate and punish others even if there are no gains from future cooperation or any other reputational gains. We document this in new one-shot experiments, which we conducted in four cities in Russia and Switzerland. Our cross-cultural approach allows us furthermore to investigate how the cultural background influences strong reciprocity. Our results show that culture has a strong influence on positive and in especially strong negative reciprocity. In particular, we find large cross-cultural differences in ‘antisocial punishment’ of pro-social cooperators. Further cross-cultural research and experiments involving different socio-demographic groups document that the antisocial punishment is much more widespread than previously assumed. Understanding antisocial punishment is an important task for future research because antisocial punishment is a strong inhibitor of cooperation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (48) ◽  
pp. 12241-12246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Hilbe ◽  
Laura Schmid ◽  
Josef Tkadlec ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee ◽  
Martin A. Nowak

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other’s reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These “leading-eight” strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.


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