Assessment of the Vertical Mergers, Before and After the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, is there a Difference?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karan Rana
Keyword(s):  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Merger Guidelines ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Vertical Mergers

scholarly journals Mergers with Differentiated Products: Where Do We Stand?

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-212
Author(s):  
Tommaso Valletti ◽  
Hans Zenger
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
10Th Anniversary ◽  
Merger Guidelines ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
Unilateral Effects ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Differentiated Product Markets

AbstractOn the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this article provides an overview of the state of economic analysis of unilateral effects in mergers with differentiated products. Drawing on our experience with merger enforcement in Europe, we discuss both static and dynamic competition, with a special emphasis on the calibration of competitive effects. We also discuss the role of market shares and structural presumptions in differentiated product markets.

Complementarities as an antitrust defense

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 344-366
Author(s):  
Dennis L. Weisman
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulations ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Network Economy ◽  
Merger Guidelines ◽  
Wide Range

We employ a Cournot model with interdependent demands to explore the interaction between demand and cost complementarities in mitigating upward pricing pressure, post-merger. The analysis reveals that even substantial increases in the HHI post-merger need not raise competitive concerns when output is redistributed from single-market to multi-market providers. Furthermore, the numerical simulations indicate that there is a wide range of demand and cost complementarity parameters over which even monopolization of the market would not be expected to result in higher prices. These findings may constructively inform merger policy and provide useful context for application of the DOJ/FTC horizontal merger guidelines in an increasingly digitized (network) economy.

scholarly journals Judicial Response to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-79
Author(s):  
Carl Shapiro ◽  
Howard Shelanski
Keyword(s):  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Average Increase ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
Merger Guidelines ◽  
Direct Competition ◽  
The Government ◽  
The U.S

AbstractWe study how the courts have responded to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Looking at decided cases, we find that both the government and merging parties rely on the 2010 Guidelines in presenting their cases, each side respectively arguing that it should win if the court properly follows them . The 2010 Guidelines had the strongest effect on the case law in the area of unilateral effects, where a number of courts have embraced them in ways that clearly depart from earlier decisions. The case law now exhibits much greater receptivity to a government showing that the merger will lead to higher prices simply due to the loss of direct competition between the two merging firms. The courts also have followed the 2010 Guidelines by more willingly defining markets around targeted customers. We do not detect any effect on decided cases of the higher concentration thresholds found in the 2010 Guidelines. Both the average pre-merger level of market concentration and the average increase in market concentration alleged by the government in litigated cases to date declined after 2010 .

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