European Banking Union and the EU Single Financial Market: More Differentiated Integration, or Disintegration?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eilis Ferran
Keyword(s):  
Financial Market ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Differentiated Integration ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Eu

scholarly journals Multilevel cooperation in the EU resolution of cross-border bank groups: lessons from the non-euro area Member States joining the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Smoleńska
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Essential Condition ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Single Resolution Mechanism ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Administrative Oversight ◽  
The Eu

AbstractCross-border banking presents a unique set of challenges in the EU from the perspective of arranging administrative oversight structures. Structuring cooperation between different EU and national authorities in a way which is conducive to trust-building and mutual engagement is an essential condition for overcoming disintegrative tendencies in the internal market. To assess how the existing EU arrangements fare in this regard in the context of EU resolution law, this article comparatively analyses the different models of multilevel administrative cooperation in the post-crisis EU framework. These are specifically the centralised model of the European Banking Union (Single Resolution Mechanism) and the relatively looser networked model of the resolution colleges. The multilevel cooperation under both models is nuanced given the distinct roles of the national resolution authorities, EU agencies and the differentiated status of non-euro area Member States in the EBU (Croatia, Bulgaria). The article’s findings allow to identify specific problems of constitutional nature pertaining to the accountability of administrative cooperation, equality of Member States and the implications of Meroni doctrine’s distortive effects.

The opportunity for euro-area reform is closing

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Content Type ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Eu

Subject Euro-area governance. Significance In the EU, macroeconomic governance reform is focusing around the creation of a euro-area budget and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) -- the final pillar for the completion of the European Banking Union (EBU) which would provide stronger insurance coverage for member states. However, northern countries are reluctant to pay for crisis-prone ones in the south, so compromise on detail could take years while the initiatives will have limited scope in responding to crises. Impacts The ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism will continue to focus on ‘risk reduction’ measures, including the disposal of non-performing loans. The EU is unlikely to give Italian budget concessions perceived as acceptable by Rome, possibly hardening the position of Italy’s populists. If Manfred Weber’s candidacy to become European Commission president fails, Berlin will likely insist that it gets the ECB president post. The rise of migration flows in the Mediterranean and the lack of EU resolution on burden-sharing will worsen north-south relations.

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zsófia Kenesey ◽  
◽  
László Pataki ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Banking Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Working Paper ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Guarantee System ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Single Rulebook ◽  
The Eu

The De Larosiére report initiating the establishment of the financial system of the European Union was published in the year following the global economic crisis of 2008, on 25 February 2009. Already in June of this year, the European Council accepted a document known as the Single Rulebook, which contains common rules related to the financial sector of the EU, however, the real break-through was achieved with the working paper accepted by the European Committee in December 2012, which initiated the establishment of the institutional system of the banking union. The individual elements of the system constituted by three pillars have been gradually developed, however, it is still not complete. The single banking supervising system started its operation in November 2014, the resolution mechanism in January 2016, however, the single deposit-guarantee system has not yet been established. The purpose of the study is to present the events of the recent 11 years, during which the currently known institutional system of the banking union was established.

scholarly journals The Single Market and Synchronized Mechanisms for the Exercise of Administrative Functions: Converging Pathways or New Pathways for Integration? The Case of the European Banking Union

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. E-154-E-179
Author(s):  
Fabio Giglioni
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Financial Integration ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Administrative Functions ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The EBU represents a clear investment in administrative integration with clear implications for the constitutional features of the EU. This paper aims to give an analysis of the administrative arrangements, through which the functions of supervision and resolution are affecting the single financial market. This case study is very interesting because these functions represent a genuine novelty in the history of financial integration since they are pre-ordained to a specific public interest: financial stability. Particularly, they cause a shift in the decision gradient from the technical to the political, as market integrity is less and less the key interest compared to financial stability. However, this wider discretionary power is not adequately counteracted by checks and balances in favour of accountability. As a result, the EBU makes a new contribution to the well-known ‘fragmentation of the executive power’ of the EU by introducing a new governance tool positioned between the Communitarian and Intergovernmental Method, but its development is still full of uncertainties given that constitutional equilibrium is far from being definitively reached.

Risks outweigh rewards for very large EU bank mergers

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Content Type ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Model Combining ◽  
Banking Markets ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Domestic Banks ◽  
The Eu

Significance The 2008-09 financial crisis led to consolidation of the EU banking sector through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of mostly domestic banks. A few EU countries have highly concentrated banking sectors, but most do not, including Germany, the least concentrated in the EU. A prime motive for merging Deutsche and Commerzbank, the country’s first and second largest banks, was that Germany’s network of exporters requires access to competitive financing. Impacts Defragmenting national banking markets and the drive for a European Banking Union (EBU) will encourage M&A approval. EU competition bodies are likely to thwart M&As among the eight to ten largest EU banks over systemic-risk fears. Successful M&As will need at least one of the partners to have a profitable core model; combining bad banks just makes a larger bad bank.

European Banking Union

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel A. Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Bank Lending ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Bank Supervision ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
International Pressure ◽  
Banking Market ◽  
National Economic ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Communist Countries

If post-communist countries realized marketized bank–state ties through transition and international pressure to privatize their banks with foreign capital, western Eurozone states have more recently come under pressure to follow suit. European Banking Union centralized bank supervision and introduced a single resolution board at the expense of national authority. Thus under banking union, national regulatory and supervisory forbearance was curbed; barriers to banking market entry were no longer the purview of national authorities; disproportionate bank lending to one’s own sovereign would be discouraged; and bank bondholders, creditors and depositors—i.e. market actors—paid the price for bank failures first, before governments and taxpayers. While European Banking Union put the euro on stronger foundations, it also curbed national economic policy discretion and limited tools for adjustment. Taking Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany as examples, this chapter explains why and in what policy areas Eurozone states’ sovereignty clashed with banking union.

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