Judicial Independence in Latin America and the (Conflicting) Influence of Cultural Norms

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Laver
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Cultural Norms

Concerns over rule of law will rise post-pandemic

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Independence

Latin America scores poorly on global assessments of both corruption perceptions and judicial independence

The New Economic History of Latin America: Evolution and Recent Contributions

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Coatsworth ◽  
William R. Summerhill
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Nobel Laureate ◽  
Applied Economics ◽  
Cultural Norms ◽  
Neoclassical Economic Theory ◽  
History Of ◽  
Douglass North

This article on economic history explores a scholarly corpus whose robust empiricism stands out from the general antipositivist trends in the historical field and thus contributes a healthy element of disciplinary pluralism. The field originally rested on two pillars, neoclassical economic theory and cliometrics—that is, the use of quantitative methods, models from applied economics, and counterfactuals to test falsifiable hypotheses. But, inspired by the work of scholars such as the Nobel laureate Douglass North, recent practitioners have added a “new institutionalism” that aims to incorporate an increased sensibility towards cultural norms.

The Evolution of Judicial Autonomy in Argentina: Establishing the Rule of Law in an Ultrapresidential System

2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Linear Process ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Diachronic Study ◽  
Judicial Autonomy

This article uses a diachronic study of Argentina to explain how the nascent democracies of Latin America build the rule of law. The changing relationship between Argentina's executive and judicial branches demonstrates that the construction of the rule of law is not a linear process. There have been periods of regression away from, as well as progress towards, the rule of law. This article uses party competition to explain Argentina's varying levels of judicial independence. The rule of law results from a balance of power between at least two political parties, neither of which has monolithic control, meaning that no highly disciplined party sustains control of both the executive and legislative branches. Competitive politics creates a climate in which an autonomous judiciary can emerge.

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