What Model Best Describes Initial Choices in a Cournot Duopoly Experiment?

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano Runco
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Duopoly

scholarly journals Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Strategic Trade Policy ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Strategic Trade ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Product Competition ◽  
Cross Ownership

AbstractBy analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).

scholarly journals The Chaos Dynamic of Multiproduct Cournot Duopoly Game with Managerial Delegation

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Wu ◽  
Junhai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Flip Bifurcation ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Oligopoly Theory ◽  
Output Fluctuations ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
High Volatility ◽  
Route To Chaos ◽  
Barrier To Entry ◽  
Intermittent Chaos ◽  
Consumer Tastes

Although oligopoly theory is generally concerned with the single-product firm, what is true in the real word is that most of the firms offer multiproducts rather than single products in order to obtain cost-saving advantages, cater for the diversity of consumer tastes, and provide a barrier to entry. We develop a dynamical multiproduct Cournot duopoly model in discrete time, where each firm has an owner who delegates the output decision to a manager. The principle of decision-making is bounded rational. And each firm has a nonlinear total cost function due to the multiproduct framework. The Cournot Nash equilibrium and the local stability are investigated. The tangential bifurcation and intermittent chaos are reported by numerical simulations. The results show that high output adjustment speed can lead to output fluctuations which are characterized by phases of low volatility with small output changes and phases of high volatility with large output changes. The intermittent route to chaos of Flip bifurcation and another intermittent route of Flip bifurcation which contains Hopf bifurcation can exist in the system. The study can improve our understanding of intermittent chaos frequently observed in oligopoly economy.

scholarly journals On the Incentives to Increase Input Efficiency under Monopoly Trade Unions

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Tapan Biswas ◽  
Jolian McHardy
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Elasticity Of Substitution ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Technological Improvement ◽  
Input Efficiency ◽  
Competitive Labor Market

We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a spatially segregated  Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions whose utility functions depend on both wages and employment. We show that with neoclassical as well as Leontief technology, unions raise wages to appropriate fully the gains from labor-saving technological (or organisational) improvements, leaving the firm with no incentive to invest in increasing the efficiency of workers. However, capital-saving     technological improvement may be profitable depending on the elasticity of substitution. Finally, we examine the implication of a fixed minimum wage (or competitive labor market) in one country.

Cournot Duopoly in Mathematica

2011 ◽  
pp. 173-188
Author(s):  
Daniel Gaynor
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Duopoly

scholarly journals Nonlinear Phenomena in Cournot Duopoly Model

Systems ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Pavel Pražák ◽  
Jaroslav Kovárník
Keyword(s):  
Demand Function ◽  
Deterministic Chaos ◽  
Linear Functions ◽  
Nonlinear Phenomena ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Limit Values ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Sensitive Dependence ◽  
Stackelberg Duopoly

The economic world is very dynamic, and most phenomena appearing in this world are mutually interconnected. These connections may result in the emergence of nonlinear relationships among economic agents. Research discussions about different markets’ structures cannot be considered as finished yet. Even such a well-known concept as oligopoly can be described with different models applying diverse assumptions and using various values of parameters; for example, the Cournot duopoly game, Bertrand duopoly game or Stackelberg duopoly game can be and are used. These models usually assume linear functions and make analyses of the behavior of the two companies. The aim of this paper is to consider a nonlinear inverse demand function in the Cournot duopoly model. Supposing there is a sufficiently large proportion among the costs of the two companies, we can possibly detect nonlinear phenomena such as bifurcation of limit values of production or deterministic chaos. To prove a sensitive dependence on the initial condition, which accompanies deterministic chaos, the concept of Lyapunov exponents is used. We also point out the fact that even though some particular values of parameters are irrelevant for the above-mentioned nonlinear phenomena, it is worth being aware of their existence.

scholarly journals Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Wei-li Zhang ◽  
Qi-Qing Song ◽  
Yi-Rong Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Stable Equilibrium ◽  
Stable Condition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Average Price ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Discrete Dynamic System ◽  
Applied Study ◽  
Homogeneous Product ◽  
Dynamic Methods

This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market’s average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.

A discrete fractional-order Cournot duopoly game

2020 ◽  
Vol 558 ◽  
pp. 124993
Author(s):  
Baogui Xin ◽  
Wei Peng ◽  
Yekyung Kwon
Keyword(s):  
Fractional Order ◽  
Cournot Duopoly

Managerial Delegation Contracts, “Green” R&D and Emissions Taxation

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Poyago-Theotoky ◽  
Soo Keong Yong
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Managerial Compensation ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Emissions Tax ◽  
Managerial Delegation ◽  
Sales Compensation ◽  
Firm Owners

Abstract We introduce an explicit environmental incentive into a managerial compensation contract in the context of a Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities under an emissions tax regime. We show that, depending on the effectiveness of “green” R&D, compared to a standard sales compensation contract, the explicit environmental focused contract results in more abatement. As a consequence, the regulator sets a lower emissions tax, and social welfare is higher. Moreover, in general, firm owners earn higher profits when adopting the environmental delegation contract.

Aspiration-Based Learning in a Cournot Duopoly Model

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manahan Siallagan ◽  
Hiroshi Deguchi ◽  
Manabu Ichikawa
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Duopoly Model
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