CEO Pay for Performance Sensitivity and Familial Relations

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniele Macciocchi
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Familial Relations

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

Examining Shareholder Value Creation over CEO Tenure: A New Approach to Testing Effectiveness of Executive Compensation

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Jianxin Gong
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Time Interval ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Ceo Pay

ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and shareholder value added over CEO tenure. The research design exploits two fundamental attributes of CEO compensation and shareholder value added: (1) both CEO compensation and shareholder value added aggregate naturally over CEO tenure, and (2) extending the time interval over which the two variables are measured is likely to result in a better match between CEO compensation and shareholder value created by the CEO. I measure CEO compensation with nominal value of CEO pay, ex post realized pay, and ex ante pay-for-performance sensitivity. I find that CEOs receiving higher nominal or realized pay create more shareholder value. Further, higher median pay-for-performance sensitivity during CEO tenure is associated with higher aggregate market value changes and cumulative abnormal stock returns. Finally, CEO pay efficiency (calculated as the ratio of shareholder value added to CEO pay, both aggregated over CEO tenure) is higher if median pay-for-performance sensitivity during CEO tenure is higher. Data Availability: The data are available from public sources identified in this study.

Placing their bets: The influence of strategic investment on CEO pay‐for‐performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 2047-2077 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Shi ◽  
Brian L. Connelly ◽  
Jeremy D. Mackey ◽  
Abhinav Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Ceo Pay

Do board interlocks support monitoring effectiveness?

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (11) ◽  
pp. 1278-1296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franziska Handschumacher ◽  
Maximilian Behrmann ◽  
Willi Ceschinski ◽  
Remmer Sassen
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Resource Dependence Theory ◽  
Risk Governance ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Interlocks ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the relationship between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness for listed German companies in a context of risk governance. While agency-theory and resource-dependence-theory suggest a positive association between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness, reasons such as limited temporal resources of busy board members may suggest a negative association. Design/methodology/approach By using panel data regression, the authors examined the association between board interlocks and monitoring effectiveness, which was approximated by excessive management compensation, pay-for-performance-sensitivity and CEO turnover-performance-sensitivity. The data set comprises 3,998 directorships for 132 listed German companies covering the period 2015-2017. Findings The authors find that board interlocks are associated with not only a more excessive management pay and less performance-sensitive turnover but also a higher pay-for-performance-sensitivity. Originality/value The study examines the impact of multiple directorships based on a German panel data set that includes both multiple appointments of members to national supervisory boards and all other appointments to national and international executive and supervisory bodies. The authors compile three measures to operationalize monitoring effectiveness.

Effectiveness of CEO pay-for-performance

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chandra S Mishra ◽  
Daniel L McConaughy ◽  
David H Gobeli
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Ceo Pay
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