Institutional Investors and Stock Return Anomalies

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger M. Edelen ◽  
Ozgur Ince ◽  
Gregory B. Kadlec
2016 ◽  
Vol 119 (3) ◽  
pp. 472-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger M. Edelen ◽  
Ozgur S. Ince ◽  
Gregory B. Kadlec

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Trabelsi

Institutional investors (active vs. passive) play various roles in the capital market and in assets prices, in particular. Institutional investors affect assets prices either because they play a monitoring role and mitigate the agency problem, or because they have information advantages, or finally, they can arbitrage away mispricing. This research note relates Hu, Ke, and Yu’s (forthcoming) article to both the traditional positive views that institutional investors are sophisticated and help correct stock mispricing and the complementary emerging literature that argues that institutions may contribute to stock return anomalies rather than eliminate them. My research note concludes that current research on the role of institutional investors has generated a number of useful insights. I identify many fundamental questions that remain unanswered, and changes in the economic environment that raise new questions for research.


2004 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 1119-1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph D. Piotroski ◽  
Darren T. Roulstone

We investigate the extent to which the trading and trade-generating activities of three informed market participants—financial analysts, institutional investors, and insiders—influence the relative amount of firm-specific, industry-level, and market-level information impounded into stock prices, as measured by stock return synchronicity. We find that stock return synchronicity is positively associated with analyst forecasting activities, consistent with analysts increasing the amount of industry-level information in prices through intra-industry information transfers. In contrast, stock return synchronicity is inversely related to insider trades, consistent with these transactions conveying firm-specific information. Supplemental tests show that insider and institutional trading accelerate the incorporation of the firm-specific component of future earnings news into prices alone, while analyst forecasting activity accelerates both the industry and firm-specific component of future earnings news. Our results suggest that all three parties influence the firm's information environment, but the type of price-relevant information conveyed by their activities depends on each party's relative information advantage.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobao Song ◽  
Wenjia Zheng

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine securities analyst independence in China's capital market and the effect on analyst independence of institutional investors’ shareholding and separation between control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate controller. Design/methodology/approach – Using data of China's listed companies from 2006 to 2012, the authors empirically tested the relationship between analyst following and volatility of stock return. And based on the test, the authors investigated the role played by institutional investors’ ownership and separation between control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate controller. Findings – According to the empirical results, there is a significant negative correlation between analyst following and volatility of stock return. Also, shareholding of institutional investors and the separation between control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate controllers will have an impact on the relationship between analyst following and volatility of stock return. When institutional investors hold higher proportion or the separation between control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate controllers keeps at a high level, the negative correlation between analyst following and volatility of stock return will weaken. Originality/value – First, based on the theory of market intermediation, the paper examined analyst independence by investigating and analyzing the relationship between analyst following and volatility of stock return. Second, it analyzed the factors affecting analyst independence by integrating enterprise characteristic variable and market characteristic variable on the basis of introducing two variables – shareholding of institutional investors and the separation between control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate controllers.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document