The Colombian Simplified Corporation An Empirical Analysis of a Success Story in Corporate Law Reform

Purpose – Alternative corporate governance systems (CGSs) have attracted a significant bulk of research recently. While the connection between the adoption of an alternative system (one tier board or two tier board system) and firms’ performances has not been fully analysed yet, the purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies which have turned into an alternative board system have eventually improved their performance over time. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of more than 15,000 Italian unlisted joint stock companies, the authors compare performance outcomes in 2009 of firms adopting alternative systems with performances of firms that maintained the system in force before the 2003 Corporate Law Reform (defined as “traditional”). Because of the choice of an alternative system (one tier or two tier board) instead of a traditional one is not random, the authors reduce selection bias implementing matching methods and comparing firms that are close in terms of propensity score measured in 2003 (the year before the new CGSs have been introduced by a corporate law reform). Findings – The authors do not find evidence of a significant improvement of performances in 2009 concerning those firms that have adopted a one tier or two tier board systems with respect to those which maintained a traditional one. Originality/value – The novelty of the study concerns the application of propensity score matching for the evaluation of the impact of the change of the CGS that is possible in presence of two conditions that are all verified in our setting: first, to have a country where corporate law allows for choosing among different systems; in this case Italy is a good laboratory, because it allows for the choice among three different systems; and second, to have the opportunity to evaluate the effect of the change in light of a relatively recent “pre-treatment” condition; this is made possible by the fact that before the 2003 Reform of corporate law all the companies had a traditional system.

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Corporate Law Reform and the Political Environment: An Empirical Analysis Employing Public-Comment Procedure Data in Japan

Asian Journal of Law and Society ◽

10.1017/als.2017.11 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 309-328

Author(s):

Hatsuru MORITA

Keyword(s):

Business Environment ◽

Corporate Law ◽

Law Reform ◽

The Political ◽

Political Environment ◽

Reform Process ◽

Corporate Managers ◽

Legal Professionals ◽

Public Comment ◽

Technical Issues

AbstractCorporate law shapes the fundamental business environment and affects various stakeholders. It is possible to determine the behaviour of various stakeholders by examining the politics of the reform process of corporate law. In order to understand the process, this paper uses the notice-and-comment procedure (public-comment procedure). Under this procedure, people submit comments to the Ministry of Justice; some of the comments are reflected in the final Bill, while others are not. The paper performs a quantitative analysis of a hand-collected dataset from two recent public-comment procedures on corporate law reform. The results showed that the bureaucrats are rigid and not willing to take public comments seriously. However, on some technical issues, legal academics, and legal professionals influence the behaviour of the bureaucrats. In addition, the bureaucrats employed these comments to honour the technical views of professionals. In other cases, corporate managers significantly influence the reform process.

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Does Regulation Matter? an Analysis of Corporate Charters in a Laissez-Faire Environment

Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History ◽

10.1017/s0212610913000025 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 31 (1) ◽

pp. 11-39 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Gonzalo Islas Rojas

Keyword(s):

Empirical Analysis ◽

Stock Markets ◽

Investor Protection ◽

Corporate Law ◽

Necessary Condition ◽

Corporate Sector ◽

Agency Model ◽

Laissez Faire ◽

Using Data ◽

The Empirical Analysis

AbstractAre laws that protect minority investors a necessary condition for the development of stock markets? This paper attempts to answer this question using data on the origins of the corporate sector in Chile to construct an empirical analysis of the contractual provisions included in charters of corporations in the 19th century. Our findings indicate that, even though corporate law at the time was silent with respect to governance rules and investor protection, a significant number of corporations were created and their shares traded. The empirical analysis of the corporate charters reveals that these contracts frequently included provisions favourable to outside investors and the use of these provisions is consistent with the predictions of a simple agency model.

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