Pre-Auction Short Positions and US Treasury Dealers’ Bidding Behavior

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Tchuindjo
Keyword(s):  
Bidding Behavior

Bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions

1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Walker ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
James C. Cox
Keyword(s):  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

Brand Equity Effects on Bidding Strategies in an Online Environment

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl S. Bozman ◽  
Matthew Q. McPherson ◽  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Ching-I Teng
Keyword(s):  
Brand Equity ◽  
Information Resources ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Online Environment ◽  
Internet Auction ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Equity Effects

Internet auction bidders seldom have all the information resources upon which they have learned to comfortably rely. This raises the possibility that internet auction participants depend more on brand related knowledge and employ bidding strategies consistent with heightened valuations of brand related information. This study empirically examines how differences in brand equity affect consumer online auction behavior on eBay. Branded products with objective values (certified coins) are examined for differences in bidding behavior across auctions. The results indicate auction participants employ incremental bidding strategies for preferred brands that have higher prices except when those brands were for coins of the highest quality. Auctions that had sellers who were not power sellers or which did not take Paypal are more prone to attract late or last minute bidders.

scholarly journals Empirical Evidence of Overbidding in M&A Contests

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1547-1579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric de Bodt ◽  
Jean-Gabriel Cousin ◽  
Richard Roll
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Indirect Evidence ◽  
Merger And Acquisition ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Profit Maximizing

Surprisingly few papers have attempted to develop a direct empirical test for overbidding in merger and acquisition contests. We develop such a test grounded on a necessary condition for profit-maximizing bidding behavior. The test is not subject to endogeneity concerns. Our results strongly support the existence of overbidding. We provide evidence that overbidding is related to conflicts of interest, but also some indirect evidence that it arises from failing to fully account for the winner’s curse.

scholarly journals The Impact of Timber Harvesting Guidelines and Timber Sale Attributes on Stumpage Bidding Behavior

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 275-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Kilgore ◽  
Charles R. Blinn
Keyword(s):  
Forest Management ◽  
Timber Harvesting ◽  
Physical Characteristics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
Timber Sale ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Twenty-seven public timber tracts were auctioned in Minnesota where bidders were required to submit two sealed bids for a tract–one with and the other without the use of timber harvesting guidelines. After the auctions, bidders were mailed a questionnaire requesting information about their logging business, the sources of information consulted in developing their bids, and perceptions of how various tract- and sale-specific factors and guidelines influenced their bidding behavior. The majority of responding timber harvesters did not consult any special sources and only one-half visited the tract before submitting their bids. Although bidding behavior was influenced by several factors, a tract's physical characteristics (e.g., volume of merchantable timber) had a greater influence on their bidding behavior than did any guidelines. Of the guidelines evaluated, those that required leaving merchantable trees (e.g., for wildlife or visual purposes) were reported to have the greatest influence on stumpage bids. Sale-specific variables (e.g., timber harvester's need for timber) had only a minimal to moderate influence on bidding behavior. The findings suggest that timber sale design can help mitigate the cost associated with implementing forest management guidelines.North. J. Appl. For. 22(4):275–280.

Alternative Strategies for Selling Land to the Highest Bidder

1988 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 817-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
P A Rogerson
Keyword(s):  
Waiting Times ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
A Priori Information ◽  
Rank Minimization ◽  
Alternative Strategies ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Initial Information ◽  
Sequential Bidding ◽  
Priori Information

In this paper the properties of several models of sequential bidding behavior are evaluated. In particular, the returns to a seller who maximizes the probability of selling to the highest bidder are compared with the returns of a rank minimization strategy which is more conservative. The comparison reveals that the rank minimization strategy will generally lead to shorter waiting times, higher expected selling prices, and lower probabilities of receiving the worst bids. Both of these objectives assume that sellers have no initial information pertaining to the distribution of bid prices. This is in sharp contrast to the more usual assumption of complete information about the parameters of the distribution. The losses associated with not having a priori information on the number of bidders are also evaluated. Under such circumstances, sellers may adopt more conservative strategies, with the consequent result of shorter waiting times and lower expected prices.

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