Basel III Capital Requirements and Regulatory Power: The Impact on Bank Risk-Taking and Credit Supply

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Spinassou
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Bank Risk ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Credit Supply ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 258
Author(s):  
Peter Zweifel
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Regulatory Focus ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Business Strategies ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Solvency Regulation ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Capital Market

Basel III, regulating the solvency of banks, is to be fully implemented by 2027 while Solvency III directed at insurers is being prepared. In view of past experience, it will be closely modelled after Basel III. This raises two questions. (i) Will Basel III and Solvency III be more successful than their predecessors? (ii) Is it appropriate to continue regulating the solvency of banks and insurers in the same way? The first question is motivated by an earlier finding that Basel I and II risked inducing more rather than less risk-taking by banks, which also holds for Solvency I and II w.r.t. insurers. The methodology applied was to determine the slope of an endogenous perceived efficiency frontier (EPEF) in (μ^,σ^)-space derived from banks’ and insurers’ optimal adjustment to exogenous changes, in expected returns dμ¯ and volatility dσ¯ on the capital market. Both Basel I and II and Solvency I and II neglected the impact of these developments on banks’ and insurers’ EPEF. This neglect had the effect of steepening the EPEF, causing senior management to opt for an increased rather than reduced value of σ^, and hence a lower solvency level. This issue is resolved by Basel III (Principle 5), which requires banks to take developments in the capital market into account in the formulation of their business strategies designed to ensure solvency. In combination with increased capital requirements, this is shown to result in a reduced slope of their EPEF and hence a reduced risk exposure. However, planned Solvency III may cause the EPEF of highly capitalized insurance companies to become steeper, with a concomitant decrease in their risk-taking and an increase of their solvency level. The second question, concerning the appropriateness of the uniformity of solvency regulation directed at banks and insurers, arises because the parameters determining the slope of the respective EPEF are found to crucially differ. Therefore, the uniformity of Basel and Solvency norms creates the risk of a mistaken regulatory focus.

Capital regulatory pressure, charter value and bank risk-taking: empirical evidence for China

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 170-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinyi Zhang ◽  
Hai Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Dynamic Panel Data ◽  
Bank Risk ◽  
Market Force ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Regulatory Pressure ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Charter Value

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify the effect of induced capital regulatory pressure on banks’ charter value and risk-taking, and the influence of bank’s charter value on its risk-taking under such a capital regulatory pressure. Design/methodology/approach The authors use two different estimations to check the robustness of the results. First, they apply a two-stage least squares mode to estimate the impact of capital requirements and bank charter value on bank risk-taking, with the influence of capital regulatory and market-force variables on bank charter value. Second, to reduce the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, the authors use dynamic panel data techniques as a check for robustness. Findings The empirical results show that higher capital requirements pressure brings about a lower charter value for banks, which in turn increases their risk-taking. The issue of banks’ risk-taking is also affected by their size: large banks seem to be more stable than their smaller counterparts. Research limitations/implications The authors’ findings suggest that regulatory pressure has had the desired impact on insolvency risk for Chinese banks due to the expected penalty triggered by a breach of capital requirements. Practical implications It is the first paper that investigates the impact of capital regulatory pressure on risk-taking of the Chinese banking system, which sheds light on concerns about regulatory monitoring of bank risk and capital regulatory framework. Social implications This paper measures the impact of capital regulation on Chinese bank charter value and risk-taking and offers some support for the implementation of Basel III in China. Originality/value The authors have constructed different measures of regulatory pressure to investigate the influence of new capital regulatory regime on banks’ behavior. Most importantly, the exogenous changes of banks’ capital ratio induced by capital regulatory pressure during the past decade that provides a unique opportunity to directly analyze the impact of capital regulatory pressure on bank charter value and risk-taking.

Shareholder risk-taking incentives in the presence of contingent capital

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Fatouh ◽  
Ayowande A. McCunn
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Basic Model ◽  
Conversion Rates ◽  
A Minor ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to present a model of shareholders’ willingness to exert effort to reduce the likelihood of bank distress and the implications of the presence of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds in the liabilities structure of a bank. Design/methodology/approach This study presents a basic model about the moral hazard surrounding shareholders willingness to exert effort that increases the likelihood of a bank’s success. This study uses a one-shot game and so do not capture the effects of repeated interactions. Findings Consistent with the existing literature, this study shows that the direction of the wealth transfer at the conversion of CoCo bonds determines their impact on shareholder risk-taking incentives. This study also finds that “anytime” CoCos (CoCo bonds trigger-able anytime at the discretion of managers) have a minor advantage over regular CoCo bonds, and that quality of capital requirements can reduce the risk-taking incentives of shareholders. Practical implications This study argues that shareholders can also use manager-specific CoCo bonds to reduce the riskiness of the bank activities. The issuance of such bonds can increase the resilience of individual banks and the whole banking system. Regulators can use restrictions on conversion rates and/or requirements on the quality of capital to address the impact of CoCo bonds issuance on risk-taking incentives. Originality/value To model the risk-taking incentives, authors generally modify the asset processes to introduce components that reflect asymmetric information between CoCo holders and shareholders and/or managers. This paper follows a simpler method similar to that of Holmström and Tirole (1998).

The impact of bank liquidity risk on risk-taking and bank lending: evidence from European bank

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-97
Author(s):  
Hongyan Liang ◽  
Zilong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Liquidity Risk ◽  
Bank Lending ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
European Banks ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior ◽  
Loan Growth ◽  
The Impact

Objective – This paper uses a sample of annual observations of European banks to examine whether the liquidity risk affects a bank’s risk-taking behavior and its future loan growth. Methodology – A sample of European banks (27 member countries of the European Union plus U.K.) over the period of 2005 to 2019 are used in this study. Liquidity risk is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Given the longitudinal nature of the data, the authors use panel regression with bank fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics that might affect the dependent variable. Findings – The authors find that banks holding more liquid assets take less risk and show a higher subsequent loan growth rate. These results hold for both small and large banks. Novelty – To the authors’ best knowledge, this is one of the earliest studies to carefully examine the effects of liquidity risk on risk-taking behavior and loan growth rate for European banks. Our research suggests that the current Basel III requirement on liquidity ratio can decrease bank’s risking-taking behavior while not necessarily impact their future loan growth. Type of Paper: Empirical JEL Classification: G21, G01, G18. Keywords: Bank Liquidity Risk; Risk-taking Behavior; Loan Growth; Basel III

scholarly journals The Impact of Private Ownership Structure on Risk Taking by Pakistani Banks: An Empirical Study

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Sajjad Hussain ◽  
Muhammad Muhaizam Bin Musa Musa ◽  
Muhammad Muhaizam Bin Musa Musa ◽  
Abdelnaser Omran Ali
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Bank Risk ◽  
Private Ownership ◽  
Private Banks ◽  
The Impact

The financial crisis of 2007-09 was converted the focus of researchers and regulators toward bank risk-taking and this study is also analyzed the private ownership structure impact on Pakistani bank’s risk-taking. This study selects the all Pakistani private banks for investigation and data is collected from financial statements from 2005 to 2016. Most of the past studies found a negative impact of private ownership structure on bank risk-taking and this study is also indicated the negative relationship between private ownership and bank risk-taking. On the other, non-performing loans are double than the international standards that highlighted the owner’s attention toward high risky investments for high return. Thus, this study suggests that check this relationship with other factors that forced the owner’s behavior toward risk.

scholarly journals Corruption and Government Intervention on Bank Risk-Taking: Cases of Asian Countries

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-237
Author(s):  
Rizky Maulana Nurhidayat ◽  
Rofikoh Rokhim
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
The Other ◽  
Bank Risk ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Dummy Variables ◽  
Macroeconomic Variables ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Impact

This paper aims to addresses the impact of corruption, anti-corruption commission, and government intervention on bank’s risk-taking using banks in Asian Countries such as  Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South of Korea during the period 1995-2016. This paper uses corruption variable, bank-specific variables, macroeconomic variables, dummy variables and interaction variable to estimate bank’s risk-taking variable. Using data from 76 banks in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea over 21 years, this research finds consistent evidence that higher level of corruption and government intervention in crisis-situation will increase the risk-taking behaviour of banks. In the other hand, bank risk-taking behaviour minimized by the existence of anti-corruption commission. In addition, this paper also finds that government intervention amplifies corruption’s effect on bank’s risk-taking behaviour because of strong signs of moral hazard and weaknesses in the governance and supervision.

Capital regulation, competition and risk-taking behavior of Indian banks in a simultaneous approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santi Gopal Maji ◽  
Preeti Hazarika
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Bank Risk ◽  
Capital Regulation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior ◽  
Indian Banks ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between capital regulation and risk-taking behavior of Indian banks after incorporating the influence of competition. Further, the study intends to enrich the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the role of human resources in managing risk along with the influence of other bank specific and macroeconomic variables. Design/methodology/approach Secondary data on 39 listed Indian commercial banks are collected from “Capitaline Plus” corporate data database for a period of 15 years. Capital is measured by capital adequacy ratio as defined by the regulators, and two definitions of risk – credit risk and insolvency risk – are employed. Competition is measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman deposits index, concentration ratio and H-statistic. The value-added intellectual coefficient model is employed to compute human capital efficiency (HCE). Three-stage least squares technique in a simultaneous equation framework is used to estimate the coefficients. Findings The study finds that absolute level of regulatory capital and bank risk are positively associated, although the influence of capital on risk is not statistically significant. The influence of competition on risk is negative for all the models, which supports the “competition stability” view. The impact of human capital on bank risk is also negative for all cases. Practical implications The findings of the study are useful for the decision makers in several ways based on the inverse influence of competition and HCE on bank risk. Further, the observed positive association between capital and risk indicates that the capital regulation is not sufficient to enhance the stability in the banking sector. Originality/value This is the first study in the Indian context that incorporates the competition in the banking industry as an explanatory variable in the extant bank capital and risk relationship.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document