Taxation of EU Cross-Border Corporate Dividends: Convergence and Tax Competition

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Garbarino
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Cross Border

scholarly journals Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition

2014 ◽  
Vol 106 ◽  
pp. 42-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Haufler ◽  
Mohammed Mardan
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Fuel Tax ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Loss Offset

Two Accounts of International Tax Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-339
Author(s):  
Ivan Ozai
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Developing Economies ◽  
Host Countries ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Relative Dependence ◽  
International Tax

The contemporary international tax regime has been increasingly criticized over the years from varied perspectives, particularly as to the unfairness it produces for developing countries. Some commentators argue it is unjust due to the lack of participation of developing countries in the policymaking process on an equal footing. Others suggest the international tax regime was designed by affluent countries to respond to self-interested goals. Some note that its current institutional design creates opportunities for tax competition and avoidance, which more seriously affect developing economies due to their relative dependence on corporate income tax and their greater vulnerability to capital mobility. Others specifically criticize how taxing rights, that is, the entitlement of countries to tax cross-border transactions, are currently allocated between home and host countries and how they disfavour capital-importing, developing countries.

Partisanship and tax competition in the American states

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Davis ◽  
Sean Nicholson-Crotty
Keyword(s):  
State Policy ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Cigarette Taxes ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
American States

AbstractExisting research identifies partisan differences in taxing choices made by state governments. Research has also found that, even when controlling for intrastate characteristics such as party, jurisdictions respond to the taxing decisions of their neighbours, particularly when citizens can easily cross-border shop. These studies treat political and competitive factors as independent influences on taxes. We suggest they are more likely to interact in taxing decisions. We argue that the political costs of cross-border shopping are higher for Republicans, and the threat of it should have a greater negative impact on taxes when that party controls major state policy-making institutions. Our analyses of state cigarette taxes between 1980 and 2011 confirm that a higher threat of cross-border shopping has a larger negative impact on taxes under Republican governors. We conclude that, by missing the interaction between partisanship and the threat of fiscal mobility, previous work misestimates key influences on tax competition.

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