scholarly journals Is Tax Compliance a Social Norm? A Field Experiment

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pietro Battiston ◽  
Simona Gamba
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Tax Compliance

scholarly journals Testing local descriptive norms and salience of enforcement action: A field experiment to increase tax collection

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Larkin ◽  
Michael Sanders ◽  
Isabelle Andresen ◽  
Felicity Algate
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Behavioral Science ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Descriptive Norm ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Social

The use of behavioral science interventions, and particularly social norms, in tax compliance is a growing industry for scholars and practitioners alike in recent years. However, the causal mechanism of these interventions is unknown, where effects could be explained by a pro-social desire to support one’s community, conditional cooperation, desire to conform, or fear of reprisals. We conduct a field experiment in local government taxation in the United Kingdom which tests the effectiveness of a social (descriptive) norm against a control condition and against messages that highlight the enforcement process. The social norm outperforms enforcement salience, suggesting that this explanation, although more powerful than the control, does not fully explain compliance effects. This study further provides evidence that social norm type interventions can be effective at the subnational level, a context where previous work has shown they may produce null effects.

scholarly journals Tax morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment

2009 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald G. Cummings ◽  
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez ◽  
Michael McKee ◽  
Benno Torgler
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Tax Morale

Does the opportunity to voice your opinion on the tax system give tax payers agency and increase tax compliance? A randomized field experiment.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Olden ◽  
Jan-Emmanuel De Neve ◽  
Erik Ø. Sørensen ◽  
Alexander Cappelen ◽  
Bertil Tungodden ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Tax System ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment ◽  
Tax Payers

scholarly journals Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadja Dwenger ◽  
Henrik Kleven ◽  
Imran Rasul ◽  
Johannes Rincke
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Local Church ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Significant Fraction ◽  
Tax System ◽  
Administrative Records ◽  
Intrinsic Motivations ◽  
Crowd Out

We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. (JEL C93, D64, H26, H71, K34, Z12)

scholarly journals The $100 Million Nudge: Increasing Tax Compliance of Businesses and the Self-Employed using a Natural Field Experiment

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Holz ◽  
John List ◽  
Alejandro Zentner ◽  
Marvin Cardoza ◽  
Joaquin Zentner
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
The Self ◽  
Natural Field ◽  
Natural Field Experiment

scholarly journals You’ve Got Mail: A Randomized Field Experiment on Tax Evasion

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (7) ◽  
pp. 2801-2819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina M. Bott ◽  
Alexander W. Cappelen ◽  
Erik Ø. Sørensen ◽  
Bertil Tungodden
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Detection Probability ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Extensive Margin ◽  
Long Term Effects ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment

We report from a large-scale randomized field experiment conducted on a unique sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers in Norway who were likely to have misreported their foreign income. By randomly manipulating a letter from the tax authorities, we cleanly identify that moral suasion and the perceived detection probability play a crucial role in shaping taxpayer behavior. The moral letter mainly works on the intensive margin, while the detection letter has a strong effect on the extensive margin. We further show that only the detection letter has long-term effects on tax compliance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.

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