Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How to Do Law and Economics Without the Coase Theorem

Author(s):  
Russell B. Korobkin
Author(s):  
Russell Korobkin

Contrary to a traditional assumption of law and economics that underlies the Coase Theorem, a substantial amount of empirical evidence demonstrates that, at least in some situations, people value entitlements more when they are endowed with them than when they are not. This chapter describes this phenomenon, knows as the “endowment effect,” with attention not only to what we know about it, but also what remains unclear about both its scope and its underlying causal mechanism. It then examines how the endowment effect might bear on positive and normative issues in four broad categories of law: the initial assignment of entitlements, the potential reassignment of entitlements, the facilitation of private transfers of entitlements, and the protection of entitlements through the judicial system. The chapter shows that, used cautiously and judiciously, evidence of the endowment effect can sharpen legal policy analysis, but also that this enterprise is complicated and fraught with peril.


2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Moss ◽  
Michael R. Fein

It is now more than forty years since Ronald Coase's seminal article on the Federal Communications Commission first appeared in the pages of the Journal of Law and Economics. The article remains important for a number of reasons, not least of which is that it offered his first articulation of the Coase Theorem. Of even greater importance for our purposes, the article literally redefined the terms of debate over American broadcast regulation, in both historical and contemporary treatments of the subject.


2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (4II) ◽  
pp. 1323-1342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Rafay Alam

In the study of law and economics, the Coase Theorem posits that an efficient allocation of resources will result when transactions costs are zero.1 These “transaction costs” may be viewed as impediments to an efficient allocation of resources and can take many forms. For example, long distances between a prospective vendor and purchaser of property and a lack of communication facilities between them would impede even the best of intentions to enter into a bargain. Similarly, the cost of mobilising labour and materials might impede a property developer from pursuing a tender for civil works. In some cases, a high rate of Stamp Duty on transactions can result in the parties reconsidering their decision to enter into such bargains. To the extent this author can claim knowledge of economics, the Coase Theorem also suggests that transaction costs and inefficiencies hamper the natural flow of bargains, result in inefficient allocation of resources and thus impact the economy. Some transaction costs are small enough to ignore whereas some, imposed, for example, by the law, are unavoidable. In such cases, a mutual understanding between the parties may see the burden of these transaction costs shared or, in others, avoided altogether. For example, the statutory requirements that all leases purporting to grant a term in excess of one year or which reserve an annual rent must be registered and stamped2 often results, in owners of residential property granting indefinitely renewable leases of 11 months and thus avoiding such requirements.


Law and World ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 55-91

This article examines the autonomous field of Law and Economics, indicates the importance of integrating the economical methodology in the process of comprehensively understanding the normative order and laments over the undesirable shortage of interdisciplinary education and academic dialogue regarding Law and Economics in Georgia. Moreover, this paper deliberates on the relevance of the Coase theorem for lawyers and policy-makers, displays the specific recommendations of its application in jurisprudence, including elucidating property rights, maximizing economic productivity and minimizing transaction costs. The following article discusses attempts and shortcomings to harmonize a decentralized market solution in environmental law and demonstrates regarding the example of the EU emission trading system that the method of Law and Economics can be used not only for a thorough analysis of the existing model but also as a pragmatic instrument for defining a normative program.


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